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I. Introduction
Traditionally, the United States has been unforgiving to those
who leak its secret, sensitive information to the public. Its attitude
toward those who publish information provided by leakers—
especially those who try to protect the identity of their sources—is
also often hostile.
The fate of Pfc. Bradley Manning will unfold in the shadow of
previous American experiences with leaks and leakers. Manning is
the U.S. soldier suspected of disgorging unprecedented amounts of

* Sandra Davidson, Ph.D., J.D., teaches media law at the University of Missouri
School of Journalism and School of Law. She is also the attorney for the Columbia
Missourian, the newspaper published by the School of Journalism. She gratefully
acknowledges the help of her teaching assistant, David Herrera, in the preparation of this
article.
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classified military and diplomatic reports to WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks,
in turn, published the documents on its website and in conjunction
1
with news media outlets around the world.
The purpose of this article is to sketch the historical context in
which Manning (or whoever actually leaked the documents),
WikiLeaks, and the news organizations associated with them find
themselves.
This article begins by reviewing how Manning reportedly
obtained the documents he gave to WikiLeaks, how authorities were
led to him, and his treatment since his arrest. It then reviews several
decades of legal action surrounding leaks, leakers, and journalists in
the United States. Throughout, this article suggests similarities and
differences between Manning’s case and previous cases.
This article thus provides an overview of how much of the
territory in which the legal community finds itself in the age of
WikiLeaks is without reference point in the past. It also suggests how
much of what is happening is an evolution from previous incidents,
and how the past might prove instructive today.

II. Bradley Manning and Release of
WikiLeaks Material Online
On July 25, 2010, WikiLeaks released an avalanche of secret U.S.
2
military intelligence and incident reports from the Afghanistan war,
in one of the largest leaks of classified data in U.S. history.
WikiLeaks gave three major publications—The New York Times,
London’s Guardian newspaper, and Der Spiegel in Germany—access

1. News media and journalists have been unusually quick to release book-length
reports on WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning, and the drama surrounding the release of
material throughout 2010. See, e.g., DAVID LEIGH AND LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS:
INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY (2011); THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF,
OPEN SECRETS: WIKILEAKS, WAR, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (2011); GREG
MITCHELL, BRADLEY MANNING: TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES (2011); MITCHELL, THE
AGE OF WIKILEAKS: FROM COLLATERAL MURDER TO CABLEGATE (AND BEYOND)
(2011). News specials have also proliferated; see CNN Presents Wiki Wars (CNN
television broadcast June 12, 2011), available at http://all-shares.com/download/g14394321cnn-presents-wiki-wars-the-mission-of-julian-assange-hdtv-xvi-af.avi.html, and WikiSecrets
(PBS Frontline television broadcast May 24, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/wikileaks/etc/transcript.html.
2. The reports are known as the Afghan War Diary or the Afghan War Logs. See
Afghanistan: The War Logs, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010 5:00 PM), available in part at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/2010/jul/25/wikileaks-afghanistan-data.
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to the files before releasing them online, and the three news
3
organizations prepared several reports to coincide with the release.
Two months prior, WikiLeaks released “Collateral Murder,” a
4
video showing a U.S. air attack that killed twelve people in Baghdad.
WikiLeaks released hundreds of thousands of additional military and

3. See A Note to Readers—Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to
Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/
world/26editors-note.html. See also Ki Price, The Man Who Spilled the Secrets, VANITY
FAIR, Feb. 2011, at 92. On The Guardian’s sifting through the information, see, e.g., CNN
Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1. On July 26, 2010, Der Spiegel announced: “In an
unprecedented development, close to 92,000 classified documents pertaining to the war in
Afghanistan have been leaked. Der Spiegel, The New York Times and The Guardian have
analyzed the raft of mostly classified documents. The war logs expose the true scale of the
Western military deployment . . ..” Matthias Gebauer et al., Explosive Leaks Provide
Image of War from Those Fighting It, SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 25, 2010, http://www.spiegel.
de/international/world/0,1518,708314,00.html. And The Guardian gave a blow-by-blow
account of the release of the documents. See Afghanistan War Logs: As it Happened,
GUARDIAN, July 26, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/jul/26/afghanistanwar-logs-wikileaks. On October 22, 2010, the Iraq War Logs hit the Internet. On the
value of the WikiLeaks’ War Logs, Dean Baquet, the Assistant Managing Editor of the
New York Times, said: “It was a remarkable insight. I mean, it was an unvarnished, rich
portrait of the daily conduct of two wars. I would argue that you came away with stuff you
didn’t get in the Pentagon Papers because of the—the rawness of the information, the
sheer day-to-day mundane life of war.” The Guardian even created a “Datablog: every
death mapped” of Iraqi deaths. Iraq War Logs: How Civilians Have Paid Heaviest Price:
Leaked Military Files Analyzed by the Guardian Reveal Secret U.S. Tally of Iraqi Deaths,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2010/oct/22/iraq-warlogs. And Der Spiegel said:
In the greatest leak in the history of the United States military,
WikiLeaks is publishing 391,832 classified documents on the Iraq war on
the Internet. The field reports from soldiers cast a new light on the war—
documenting in a unique way how the highly armed American military
was helpless in the conflict for years.
Spiegel Staff, The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs: Greatest Data Leak in US Military History,
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,
724845,00.html. Assange wanted to cloak himself in First Amendment protection by
having The NewYork Times publish first. He said: “We insisted on bringing in The New
York Times. We also insisted on The New York Times publishing first. So if there was any
debate before a jury about, had it been published first in a foreign publication or a U.S.
publication, it would be very clear it was published first in a U.S. publication.”
WikiSecrets, supra note 1. On Assange’s strategy to receive First Amendment protection,
see, e.g., David Carr, Behind War Logs, A New Kind of Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2010, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/behind-war-logs-a-new-kind-ofalliance/.
4. See COLLATERAL MURDER, http://www.collateralmurder.com/ (last visited May
15, 2011). Although WikiLeaks opened in 2007, “Collateral Murder” was the website’s
most prominent release of material. See, e.g., Noam Cohen and Brian Stelter, Iraq Video
Brings Notice to a Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/07/world/07wikileaks.html.
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5

diplomatic documents by year’s end, including the Iraq War Logs. In
April 2011 it released secret files on the military prison in
6
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. And on August 24, 2011, WikiLeaks
7
announced it would release 35,000 more diplomatic cables.
In keeping with a policy of protecting their sources, WikiLeaks
8
and its leader, Julian Assange, have not said how they obtained the
9
documents. The website did say, however, that WikiLeaks had
10
offered Manning legal assistance.

5. WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.ch (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The second
batch of military documents, from Iraq, are known to WikiLeaks as the Iraq War Logs,
although some organizations, such as The New York Times, now refer to the collective set
of Iraq and Afghanistan reports as The War Logs. WikiLeaks again allowed The New
York Times, Guardian, and Der Spiegel early access to the Iraq documents, but it also
granted early access to other global media, including France’s Le Monde newspaper and
the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network. See, e.g., David Leigh, Iraq war logs: WikiLeaks v.
Washington, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 22, 2010. See also, Price, supra note 3, at 92.
On the 251,287 diplomatic documents, see, e.g., Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, State’s
Secrets: Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2010, at A1. For more general information on Wikileaks and its activities, see Yochai
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011).
6. WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/ (last visited Oct 11. 2011).
7. See, e.g., Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, WikiLeaks Releases Tens of
Thousands of New Classified U.S. Diplomatic Cables, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Aug. 26, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/8/26/headlines/wikileaks_releases_tens_of_thousands
_of_new_cables; Melissa Jeltsen, WikiLeaks: 35,000 Diplomatic Cables To Be Released
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.huffington post.com/2011/08/24/wikileaks35--diplom. For more on what perhaps precipitated the timing of this WikiLeaks dump,
see infra note 19.
8. See, e.g., Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40 (an
extensive profile of Assange and his forming of WikiLeaks).
9. Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency’
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A11. See also Gaviria and Smith, supra note 1 (Assange says
that WikiLeaks’ software design prevents identification of sources.
WikiLeaks’
technology does not collect sources, in line with Assange’s principle that, in his words,
“the best way to keep a secret is to never have it.”) On September 1, 2011, Assange did
seem to say that David Leigh of The Guardian had pointed at Manning.
10. Schmitt, supra note 9. Manning also received public support from Daniel
Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the last dramatic leak case that faced
the U.S. government prior to the War Logs. Cf. New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971). “Bradley Manning has been defending and supporting our constitution,”
Ellsberg said. Chris McGreal, Campaign to Free Soldier who Leaked Afghan War Logs,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2010, at 24. Ellsberg also supported Assange. He flew to London to
appear at a news conference with Assange shortly after the leak of the Iraq war
documents. Pentagon demands for Assange to return any classified materials he
possessed, according to Ellsberg, were couched in the same careful language that he heard
after release of the Pentagon Papers. “Secrecy is essential to empire,” Ellsberg
commented. John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder Gets Support in
Rebuking U.S. on Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24london.html.
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The U.S. government was less reserved than WikiLeaks and
Assange. Not long after WikiLeaks released the Afghanistan files,
11
the government declared Manning a “person of interest” in the leak.
The government had already arrested him on suspicion of leaking the
12
helicopter video and diplomatic documents, and he was in custody

In his December 10, 2010 interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now!, Ellsberg
said of the WikiLeaks case:
Well, in this case, as in the Pentagon Papers, I do give The New York
Times credit for working with these materials and presenting material to
their readers. And in fact . . . if they [government authorities] find a
crime, or if they invent a crime or pass a . . . criminal law that would
cover WikiLeaks, it will cover The New York Times, and you, Democracy
Now!, and anyone who presents news that in part reflects leaks . . .
unauthorized disclosures from within the government.
Actually, the wording of the Espionage Act, which . . . was not intended
for this purpose . . . is so broad that it applies to readers of this classified
information . . . [T]hey’d have to return their copy of The New York
Times, I guess, to the Justice Department. That actually is in line with
what the government has been saying right now, directing its employees
that they cannot download WikiLeaks or The New York Times sites that
reports the WikiLeaks onto their computers at work or at home . . .
We’re in an absurd position here with a close down of public discussion
of official matters, very similar to that of China. In fact, I even wonder
whether there’s a rule that absurd in China.
Daniel Ellsberg’s interview with Amy Goodman, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/10/whistleblower_daniel_ellsberg_julian_assange_is.
11. David S. Cloud, Army Officer a ‘Person of Interest,’ L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at
A6.
12. Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry Into Disclosure of Reports to
WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at A4. Significant controversy surrounds how the
military came to know of Manning and arrest him on May 26, 2010.
In June 2010, Wired published extensive excerpts of an instant-message conversation
allegedly between Manning and Adrian Lamo, a “former hacker.” Lamo eventually told
the FBI and the Army about his chats with Manning.
The excerpts portray Manning as confessing to stealing data from government computers
while serving in Iraq, including the “Collateral Murder” video and diplomatic cables,
which he then passed to WikiLeaks. “i can’t believe what im confessing to you,” Manning
allegedly wrote. The logs apparently include Manning’s descriptions of how he acquired
the data:
(01:54:42 PM) Manning: i would come in with music on a CD-RW [a rewritable CD]
(01:55:21 PM) Manning: labelled with something like “Lady Gaga”…
erase the music . . . then write a compressed split file
(01:55:46 PM) Manning: no-one suspected a thing
(01:55:48 PM) Manning: =L kind of sad
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when WikiLeaks released the Afghanistan files and subsequent
13
material.

As well as Manning and Lamo discussing the lax security surrounding the
supposedly highly secret material:
(01:56:36 PM) Lamo: from a professional perspective, i’m curious how
the server they were on was insecure
(01:57:19 PM) Manning: you had people working 14 hours a day . . .
every single day . . . no weekends . . . no recreation . . .
(01:57:27 PM) Manning: people stopped caring after 3 weeks
(01:57:44 PM) Lamo: i mean, technically speaking
(01:57:51 PM) Lamo: or was it physical
(01:57:52 PM) Manning: >nod<
(01:58:16 PM) Manning: there was no physical security
(01:58:18 PM) Lamo: it was physical access, wasn’t it
(01:58:20 PM) Lamo: hah
(01:58:33 PM) Manning: it was there, but not really
(01:58:51 PM) Manning: 5 digit cipher lock . . . but you could knock and
the door . . .
(01:58:55 PM) Manning: *on
(01:59:15 PM) Manning: weapons, but everyone has weapons
(02:00:12 PM) Manning: everyone just sat at their workstations…
watching music videos / car chases / buildings exploding . . . and writing
more stuff to CD/DVD . . . the culture fed opportunities
Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, ‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing to You’: The Wikileaks
Chats, WIRED (June 10, 2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/
06/wikileaks-chat/. Later in 2010, Poulsen and Salon blogger Glenn Greenwald engaged in
an extended debate about whether Wired needed to release the entire log of the chat
between Manning and Lamo. Wired had released only 25 percent of the transcript,
claiming that it held back portions that “discuss deeply personal information about
Manning or that reveal apparently sensitive military information.” Greenwald claimed
that Wired needed to release the logs because Lamo had been claiming to news media that
Manning did or did not tell Lamo certain things, which the logs would reveal, and which
would clarify what Lamo could have told the government. See Glenn Greenwald, The
Worsening Journalistic Disgrace at Wired, SALON (Dec. 27, 2010, 4:28 PM),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/27/wired; Evan Hansen &
Kevin Poulsen, Putting the Record Straight on the Lamo-Manning Chat Logs, WIRED
(Dec. 28, 2010, 9:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/greenwald/; Glenn
Greenwald, Response to Wired’s Accusations, SALON (Dec. 29, 2010, 8:01 AM),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/29/wired_response_1; Glenn
Greenwald, Wired’s Refusal to Release or Comment on the Manning Chat Logs, SALON
(Dec. 29, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/
29/wired_1.
13. The New York Times, which has perhaps worked more closely with WikiLeaks
than has any other American news outlet, does not seem to be in the Administration’s
crosshairs, according to the paper:
Do you think that what you do is consistent with what you understand
Assange and WikiLeaks did? Mr. Holder asked a reporter. “Would I
have liked not to see the stuff appear? Yes. But did The Times act in a
responsible way? I would say yes. I am not certain I would say that about
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In early March 2011, the Army charged Manning with 22 counts,
14
including aiding the enemy, which could carry a death sentence.
That month, Manning was placed under “prevention of injury watch,”
which required him to be stripped naked nightly until an inspection in
15
the morning.
After the news of Manning’s treatment broke, President Barack
Obama said he had been assured by the Pentagon that Manning’s
confinement met the United States’s “basic standards.”
The administration struggled to straighten its stories, however.
The day before President Obama spoke, P.J. Crowley, the State
those people who were responsible for the initial leaks and the wholesale
dumping of materials.”
Charlie Savage, For Attorney General, New Congress Means New Headaches, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2010 at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/us/politics/
31holder.html. The Times and other media, though, have worked with Assange and
WikiLeaks, not Manning. Bill Keller, the top editor at the Times, wrote in January 2011
that the newspaper “regarded Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or
collaborator, but he was a man who clearly had his own agenda.” Bill Keller, Dealing with
Assange and the Wikileaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at 32, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html. The release of the War Logs
prompted key U.S. senators to announce that whatever proposals for federal shield laws
for journalists emerged, the proposals would specifically exclude from shield-law coverage
any organization that disseminated classified or confidential material but that did not add
any reporting or context. Paul Farhi, Wikileaks is Barrier to Shield Arguments, WASH.
POST, Aug. 21, 2010, at C1. Democratic senators who were working on shield law
legislation are now “backpedaling from WikiLeaks,” and senators Charles Schumer (DN.Y.) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) are working on an amendment that will give shield
protection to traditional news gathering but withhold it from websites that are used to
disseminate secret information en masse. See Charlie Savage, After Afghan War Leaks,
Revision in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at 12, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/08/04/us/04shield.html (also describing WikiLeaks as “a confederation of opengovernment advocates who solicit secret documents for publication”); see also John
Eggerton, Is Shield Law the Next Wikileaks Victim? D.C. Debates Effects of Leaked Docs
on Bill Protecting Journalists, BROAD. & CABLE (Dec. 5, 2010, 9:01 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/460623-Is_Shield_Law_the_Next_WikiLeaks_
Victim_.php.
14. There was speculation that the ratcheting up of the charges was an attempt to
pressure Manning into a plea-bargaining agreement. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Soldier in
WikiLeaks Case Charged With Aiding the Enemy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-wikileaks-manning-20110303,0,379
8837.story.
15. Manning was not, however, placed on suicide watch. Charlie Savage, Soldier in
Leaks Case Will Be Made to Sleep Naked Nightly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A8.
According to Manning’s lawyer, the restriction began after Manning, frustrated with the
conditions of his imprisonment, “sarcastically stated that if he wanted to harm himself, he
could conceivably do so with the elastic waistband of his underwear or with his flip-flops.”
David E. Coombs, The Truth Behind Quantico Brig’s Decision to Strip PFC Manning, THE
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Mar. 5, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://www.army
courtmartialdefense.info/2011/03/truth-behind-quantico-brigs-decision-to.html.
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Department spokesman, told a private audience that the restrictions
against Manning were “ridiculous and counterproductive and
16
17
stupid.” Crowley soon resigned.
In April 2011, the U.S. military moved Manning from the brig at
Quantico, Virginia, to a military prison in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
where he would have “a larger cell, plus several hours a day with the
rest of the prison population for exercise, meals, and other activities,”
18
according to The Christian Science Monitor.
In May 2011, a federal grand jury began hearing testimony to
determine whether Assange and WikiLeaks could face prosecution
19
under the 1917 Espionage Act. A leaked subpoena also said the

16. See Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks Suspect’s Treatment ‘Stupid,’ U.S. Official Says,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/11/AR2011031106542.html.
17. Crowley Quits Over Manning Comments, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, (Mar. 13, 2011,
6:02 PM), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2011/03/201131317356184984.html.
18. Brad Knickerbocker, Alleged ‘WikiLeaker’ Bradley Manning Sent to Less
Restrictive Prison, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Justice/2011/0421/Alleged-WikiLeaker-Bradley-Manning-sent-to-less-restrictiveprison.
While all this happened, authorities in Europe continued moving against Assange for
allegations that he raped two women in Sweden. Assange was released on bail, subject to
curfew, in London while an extradition battle was fought in court. In late February 2011,
Assange lost his fight against extradition to Sweden. Esther Addley, Make This Case
Bigger Than Me, GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2011, at 3. Assange promptly appealed, indefinitely
delaying the extradition, which would have taken place within 10 days of the ruling against
him. “We have always known we would appeal,” he told the media after the ruling.
James Meikle, Assange Starts Appeal Against Extradition to Sweden, GUARDIAN, Mar. 4,
2011, at 10. Ironically, Assange apparently complained that somebody leaked to The
Guardian a copy of the Swedish police report about his alleged sexual transgressions. See,
e.g., Robert Barr, Leak Bothers Founder of Wikileaks; Police Report on Assange
Disclosed, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2010, at 7.
19. Ed Pilkington, WikiLeaks: US opens grand jury hearing, GUARDIAN, May 11,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury- hearing.
On August 25, 2011, the group Citizens for Legitimate Government sent
out an email that said, under the heading of “U.S. invokes Patriot Act as
WikiLeaks dumps more data:”
The U.S. government has reportedly invoked the controversial Patriot
Act as a legal basis for demanding data from Internet provider Dynadot
about WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. The whistle-blowing organization
[WikiLeaks] recently received a copy of the (now) unsealed court order,
which was apparently signed by a U.S. magistrate judge on January 4,
2011. “Using the terms of the Patriot Act the order was issued to
Dynadot, the domain registrars [sic] for wikileaks.org, for all information
they hold on WikiLeaks, Julian Assange and wikileaks.org,” the
organization confirmed in an official statement.
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grand jury was considering a prosecution on grounds of “knowingly
accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized
access” and “knowingly stealing or converting any record or thing of
value of the United States or any department or agency thereof,”
charges which, according to The Guardian, “would appear to
20
point . . . in the direction of Bradley Manning.”

III. Classified Means Classified, But Unclassified Can Also
Count: Snepp, Marchetti, Plame-Wilson, The Progressive
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been kind to persons who leak
information—even unclassified information, as illustrated in 1980 in
21
Snepp v. United States.
CITIZENS FOR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.legitgov.org/.
However, Reuters said that a “U.S. official” had indicated that the court order had not
been officially unsealed. See WikiLeaks Publishes Tens of Thousands More Cables,
REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/26/uswikileaks-idUSTRE77O7PZ20110826.
Within hours of revealing on Twitter that
Dynadot, a California Internet registrar that hosted WikiLeaks, had received and
complied with the court order issuing from Alexandria, Virginia, WikiLeaks started
dumping more diplomatic cables, Reuters reported. Id. The order demanded that
Dynadot disclose “customer or subscriber account information for each account registered
to or associated with Wikileaks, the individual Julian Assange, or the domain name
wikileaks.org for the time period November 1, 2009 to present.” In re Application of the
United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. No.
10GJ3793 (E.D. Va., Jan. 4, 2011), reprinted by WikiLeaks, available at http://
wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/Dynadot_2703_ d_Order.pdf.
20. Pilkington, supra note 19; see also Greenwald, FBI Serves Grand Jury Subpoena
Likely Relating to WikiLeaks, SALON (Apr. 27, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.salon.com/
news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/radio/2011/04/27/wikileaks.
21. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Nor has the Supreme Court been
good to parties requesting information that arguably fell under the “national security”
umbrella. In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court ruled against ordering the CIA
to release information about the CIA’s MKULTRA program. The Court described this
broad program as follows:
Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency financed a
wide-ranging project, code-named MKULTRA, concerned with “the
research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological
materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control
human behavior.” The program consisted of some 149 subprojects that
the Agency contracted out to various universities, research foundations,
and similar institutions. At least 80 institutions and 185 private
researchers participated. Because the Agency funded MKULTRA
indirectly, many of the participating individuals were unaware that they
were dealing with the Agency. MKULTRA was established to counter
perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and
interrogation techniques. Over the years the program included various
medical and psychological experiments, some of which led to untoward
results.
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In 1968 during the Vietnam War, Frank Snepp went to work for
the CIA. As a condition of employment, Snepp had to agree to
submit to the CIA for prior clearance any information on the CIA
that he wanted to publish. This was a lifetime agreement, and it was a
precondition to his working at the CIA. After leaving the CIA,
Snepp published a book titled Decent Interval about the CIA’s
22
activities during the Vietnam War, which had already ended. Not
surprisingly, the CIA thought there was no “decent interval.”
The government agreed that the book contained no classified
23
information. Still, Snepp “violated his obligation to submit all
24
material for prepublication review.”
The government wanted an injunction requiring Snepp to submit
all his future writings for prior clearance. The government also
25
wanted all the profits from Snepp’s book. The government got
26
both. During the trial, the director of the CIA testified that books
such as Snepp’s had caused a number of foreign intelligence sources
27
to discontinue providing information to the United States.
The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion said that “even in the
absence of an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to
protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable
restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be
protected by the First Amendment.” The Court then identified two
substantial government interests: “the government has a compelling
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to
our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so
Id. at 161–62 (footnote omitted). As for those “untoward results”: “Several MKULTRA
subprojects involved experiments where researchers surreptitiously administered
dangerous drugs, such as LSD, to unwitting human subjects. At least two persons died as
a result of MKULTRA experiments, and others may have suffered impaired health
because of the testing.” Id. at 62 n.2. In short, the CIA was testing the effectiveness of
biological and chemical materials in changing human behavior, performing the tests on
human guinea pigs without gaining their informed consent. The Supreme Court upheld
the CIA’s refusal to disclose names of MKULTRA researchers, invoking the “national
security” exemption for “intelligence sources.” Id. at 173. Now a group of veterans is
suing the CIA in federal court for information about alleged experiments on veterans. On
September 1, 2011, the veterans filed objections to the CIA’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. See Vietnam Veterans of America v. CIA, No. CV 09-0037-CW, (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/08/01/Plaintiff%20
Opposition%20to%20CIAs%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf.
22. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507–08.
23. Id. at 510.
24. Id. at 511.
25. Id. at 508–09.
26. Id. at 509, 515–16.
27. Id. at 512–13.
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essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service.” The CIA could impose “reasonable restrictions,” the Court
said, and the agreement Snepp signed with the CIA was a
“reasonable means” for protecting the government interests in
28
secrecy of information and appearance of confidentiality.
In this case, none of the information that Snepp used in his book
was classified, as the government conceded, so none of the
information was secret. Still, the “appearance of confidentiality”
arguably posed a problem. The CIA director testified that books
such as Snepp’s were causing problems with intelligence sources who
29
feared disclosure. Consequences of disclosure, of course, could be
disastrous to these sources who arguably deserved protection. The
Court said:
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that a
former intelligence agent’s publication of unreviewed material
relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital
national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment
about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA—with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources—could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign
sources depends upon the CIA’s ability to guarantee the
security of information that might compromise them and even
30
endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
31

And so the Supreme Court had to weigh and balance interests.
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting, said, “Inherent in this prior
restraint is the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority

28. Id. at 510.
29. Id. at 512–13.
30. Id. at 511–12 (footnote omitted).
31. On Snepp, see, e.g., Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium,
National Security and Civil Liberties, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1984).
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to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to
32
modify the contents of his work beyond the demand of secrecy.”
33
United States v. Marchetti appears to illustrate Justice Stevens’
words about the risk of abuse by the reviewing agency. Marchetti, a
former CIA agent, was working on a manuscript. The CIA heard
about his work and got an injunction ordering the former CIA agent
to submit his manuscript for CIA review. The Fourth Circuit
remanded the case, ordering that the injunction be limited to
34
In doing so, however, the Fourth Circuit
classified information.
made clear, in a section heading, that “The Freedom of Speech and of
the Press are not Absolute.” The court said: “We readily agree with
Marchetti that the First Amendment limits the extent to which the
United States, contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy
requirements upon its employees and enforce them with a system of
prior censorship.” For example, the court said the First Amendment
would not permit prior restraint of unclassified information or
information the government had disclosed. The court epmhasized,
“we are here concerned with secret information touching upon the
national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs, acquired by
Marchetti while in a position of trust and confidence and
35
contractually bound to respect it.”
The court, under the heading of “The Government has a Right to
Secrecy,” pointed to the power and responsibility of the president.
The court said, “Gathering intelligence information and the other
activities of the Agency, including clandestine affairs against other
nations, are all within the President’s constitutional responsibility for
the security of the Nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander
36
in Chief of our Armed forces.” The United States began in secrecy,
the Court noted, as “[s]ecrecy governed the deliberations in
37
Philadelphia in 1787.”
In Snepp, the Supreme Court commented that the government’s
concession that Snepp’s work contained no classified information
38
distinguished Snepp from Marchetti.

32. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined Stevens in this dissent).
33. 466 F.2d 1309, (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
34. Id. at 1318.
35. Id. at 1313.
36. Id. at 1315.
37. Id. at 1316, (quoting Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (1971)).
38. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510 n.4.

2011]

LEAKS, LEAKERS, AND JOURNALISTS

39

Marchetti’s second appearance in front of the Fourth Circuit
happened in the wake of the remand. Marchetti collaborated with a
former State Department employee, John Marks, to co-author a
book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Alfred A. Knopf wanted
to publish the book, but first the CIA reviewed the manuscript, per
the first Fourth Circuit decision. The CIA wanted to censor 339
sections of the book. After negotiations with Knopf, the CIA
39
approved 168 deletions. The book publisher sued for release of the
remaining deletions. The district court approved deletion of only 26
40
sections of the book.
Not waiting for the Fourth Circuit’s 1975 decision, Knopf
published the book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence in 1974 with
168 blank spaces. In the blank spaces repeatedly appears the notation
41
“DELETED.”
42
In 2009, in Wilson v. CIA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the request by Valerie Plame Wilson and book publisher
39. Fred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 1368.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit declared:
We decline to modify our previous holding that the First Amendment is
no bar against an injunction forbidding the disclosure of classifiable
information within the guidelines of the Executive Orders when (1) the
classified information was acquired, during the course of his
employment, by an employee of a United States agency or department in
which such information is handled and (2) its disclosure would violate a
solemn agreement made by the employee at the commencement of his
employment. With respect to such information, by his execution of the
secrecy agreement and his entry into the confidential employment
relationship, he effectively relinquished his First Amendment rights.
Id. at 1370. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case, ordering the district judge to authorize
only disclosure of classified information that Marchetti and Marks learned “unofficially
after the termination of their employment.” Id. at 1371.
41. On Marchetti, see, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free
Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 297–98 (2005); and Michael L. Charlson, The
Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review of Government Employees’ Speech,
72 CAL. L. REV. 962, 990 (1984).
The saga of Marchetti took yet another twist. A seemingly exasperated Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in a case brought by Martin Halperin, then Director for the Center for
National Security Studies, said: “A continuing effort publicly to disclose classified
information obtained by Victor Marchetti in his capacity as a highly placed official in the
Central Intelligence Agency brings this simmering controversy before us for the third
time.” Colby v. Halperin, 656 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1981). Halperin had filed a Freedom of
Information request for the material and so wanted the classified information released to
his attorney. The Fourth Circuit found “no compelling necessity” to release the
information and thus denied the request. Id.
42. 586 F.3d 171, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Simon & Schuster, Inc. to force the CIA to permit publication of
certain information about her CIA employment in her memoir, Fair
Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House. The CIA
did not violate Wilson’s First Amendment rights, the court concluded,
when its Publication Review Board forbade publication of any
43
material about Wilson’s possible pre-2002 work for the CIA.
Another case that, like Snepp, involved no classified information,
bubbled up in Madison, Wisconsin—United States v. Progressive,
44
Inc. A monthly magazine, The Progressive, was set to publish an
article titled, “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re
Telling It.” The U.S. government got a temporary restraining order
after a hearing and then sought a preliminary injunction against
publication of the article. The judge called the situation “a clash
43. Id. at 173. Whether Wilson worked for the CIA prior to 2002 has long been
undisputed. In 2007, U.S. Rep. Jay Inslee (D-Wash.) introduced a bill in the House that
would have allowed Wilson to receive retirement benefits from the CIA despite her not
having reached the required age. Inslee praised Wilson’s “20 years of service” on the floor
of the House. He also included in the Congressional Record, with Wilson’s permission, a
copy of a letter sent to Wilson by the CIA that detailed her employment with the agency
from 1985 to 2007. Id. at 180–82. No classification markings were on the letter when
Wilson received it. But three days after Inslee introduced the bill, Wilson received a
second letter saying that the original communication “was not properly marked” and that
its content “remains classified.” No action was ever requested of Congress regarding its
record. Id. at 181. When Simon & Schuster published Fair Game in 2007, it marked the
redacted material by blacking out lines in the text. It included a “Publisher’s Note”
describing the reason for the redactions and reminding readers that the information in
question “has already been widely disseminated.” The publisher also included an
afterword, written by a reporter that provided essentially the same information as was
censored. Id. at 182–83. The sagas of Judith Miller and Valerie Plame have spawned at
least two movies. Fair Game was adapted into a Hollywood film starring Naomi Watts as
Valerie Wilson and Sean Penn as Joseph Wilson. Critic Roger Ebert said the film was
“unusually bold for a fictionalization based on real events.” Roger Ebert, Fair Game, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20101103/REVIEWS/101109993/1023. In 2008, Nothing but the Truth, starring Kate
Beckinsale, Matt Dillon, Angela Bassett, Alan Alda, and David Schwimmer, covered a lot
of shield law as it told the story of a female reporter who reveals the name of an
undercover CIA agent and then chooses to go to jail rather than disclose her source’s
identity. In the movie, the CIA agent is murdered, the reporter is badly beaten in jail, and
the reporter’s case goes to the Supreme Court where the reporter’s attorney argues for
Branzburg’s reversal. The Court decides, again 5 to 4, in favor of national security instead
of the First Amendment. The movie has a surprise ending of sorts. And yet another
skirmish between the CIA and a book author erupted in the summer of 2011 when the
CIA demanded that former CIA agent Ali H. Soufan make extensive cuts in his memoir.
Soufan criticized the CIA, saying that it withheld information from the FBI about two
men who became hijackers on 9/11 and that it engaged in unnecessarily brutal
interrogation. See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Demands Cuts in Book About 9/11 and Terror
Fight, N.Y.. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/us/26agent .html?
pagewanted=all.
44. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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between allegedly vital security interests of the United States and the
competing constitutional doctrine against prior restraint in
45
publication.” The bright author, Howard Morland, contended that
46
he had merely synthesized material available to anyone. The editor,
Erwin Knoll, argued that “this country’s security does not lie in an
oppressive and ineffective system of secrecy and classification but in
open, honest, and informed public debate about issues which the
47
people must decide.” The judge was not convinced that all of the
48
information was available to the public. Nor did he agree with their
49
arguments.
The judge thought the government met its high standard of proof
in this case. The government admitted that at least some of the
information on the H-bomb contained in the article was in the public
domain. But even though the material was in the public domain, the
government said, “national security” permitted barring its publication
because “when drawn together,” when “synthesized,” the information
presents “immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of
50
the United States.”
The judge did not make his decision lightly. He said, “A mistake
in ruling against The Progressive will . . . curtail defendant’s First
Amendment rights in a drastic and substantial fashion,” but, “a
mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is
51
extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot.”

45. Id. at 991.
46. Id. at 995.
47. Id. at 995–96.
48. Id. at 995.
49. The judge said that this case was different than the Pentagon Papers case. First,
the Pentagon Papers had contained only “historical data.” That was not the case with the
H-bomb article. Second, in the Pentagon Papers case, the government had not proved
that publication would affect national security. Id. at 994. On the Pentagon Papers, see
infra note 105 to 119 and accompanying text.
50. 467 F. Supp. at 991. The judge said that “the danger lies in the exposition of
certain concepts never heretofore disclosed in conjunction with one another.” Id. at 993.
No, the article did not “provide a ‘do-it-yourself’ guide for the hydrogen bomb,” the judge
said, but he thought the information it contained might help a “medium size nation”
develop an H-bomb more quickly. Id. In short, “The Morland piece could accelerate the
membership of a candidate nation in the thermonuclear club.” The judge pointed out that
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2104, permitted injunctions against anyone
communicating restricted data with reason to believe it would injure the United States. Id.
at 994.
51. Id. at 996.
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The judge relied on Near v. Minnesota, using the “troop
52
movements” exception to allow prior restraint.
He pointed out that times had changed since 1931 when the
Supreme Court issued Near—that foot soldiers had been replaced by
machines. Publishing technical information on the H-bomb was
53
analogous to publishing troop movements, the judge concluded.
The government had not sought to extinguish the article in its
entirety but to delete “certain technical information” from the
54
Before any further decisions were handed down in The
article.
Progressive case, it, in effect, became moot. A daily newspaper in
Madison published a letter that included a diagram of the H-bomb
and a list of its components. With the information already in print,
the government dropped its case against The Progressive, and the
55
magazine published the article in its November 1979 issue.
No charges were ever filed against anyone for the publication of
the H-bomb information. Nor did Snepp, Marchetti, or PlameWilson face criminal prosecution for their actions. The United States
treats Manning with a great deal more seriousness. Given the
massive size and classification of the leaked material, perhaps this
difference should be expected.

52. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In the 5-4 Near decision, the Court said that protection from
prior restraint was “not absolutely unlimited” but could occur in “exceptional cases.”
Then the Court listed four “exceptional cases” where prior restraint of publication could
be acceptable: cases of (1) obstruction of military recruitment; (2) publishing “sailing dates
of transports of the number and location of troops;” (3) obscenity; and (4) “incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of government.” 283 U.S. at 716. In Nebraska
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court would add a fifth exceptional case:
prior restraint to protect a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.
53. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
54. Id. at 997.
55. Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling It,
PROGRESSIVE (1979), http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf; see also Erwin
Knoll, The H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 705 (1994)
and Nation: Grievous Harm, TIME, Mar. 19, 1979, available at http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947008,00.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). PBS included
the Progressive case in its coverage on Frontline. National Security v. The Role of the
Press, PBS http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/ part1/role.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2011) (a rundown of past and ongoing conflicts between the press and the federal
government over the issue of publishing information that the government believes
endangers national security). On arguments for the necessity of national security, see
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006). For an interesting article on the origin of the phrase,
“The Constitution is not a suicide pact,” see David Corn, The “Suicide Pact” Mystery:
Who Coined the Phrase? Justice Goldberg or Justice Jackson? SLATE (Jan. 4, 2002, 11:04
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2060342/.
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By contrast, Samuel Morison, did face criminal prosecution for
leaking a small amount of classified data with motives that did not
engender much sympathy.

IV. Morison: A Counterpart to Manning with
Big-Friend Support
Morison did not stand alone in United States v. Morison.
him as amici curiae were:

56

Beside

The Washington Post; CBS, Inc.; National Broadcasting
Company, Inc.; Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Time, Inc;
Newsweek; U.S. News & Word Report; The Wall Street
Journal; The New York Times; The New York Daily News;
The Los Angeles Times; The Chicago Tribune; The Boston
Globe; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution; The Miami
Hearld; The Dallas Morning News; The Minneapolis Star and
Tribune; Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.; The Associated Press;
National Public Radio; Pulitzer Broadcasting Company; The
American Society of Newspaper Editors; The American
Newspaper Publishers Associations; The American Booksellers
Association, Inc.; Associated Press Managing Editors; The
Magazine Publishers Association; The National Association of
Broadcasters; The Newspaper Guild; The Radio-Television
News Directors Association; The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press; The Society of Professional Journalists
and Public Citizen; Washington Legal Foundation; and The
57
Allied Education Foundation.
To what heroic lengths did Morison rise to garner such prestigious
support? In part, he violated the Espionage Act, giving classified
58
information to persons unauthorized to receive it. He did not

56. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988).
57. Id.
58. The Espionage Act covers a broad waterfront of punishable offenses.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 793, titled “Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing Defense Information,”
Congress targets “[w]hoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” engages in
prohibited activities involving that national defense information. Id. § 793(a). The
prohibition extends to anyone who “copies, takes, makes, or obtains . . . anything
connected with the national defense” or who “receives or obtains . . . from any source
whatever . . . anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to
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believe, at the time he receives or obtains . . . it, that it has been . . . taken, made, or
disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions” of the Espionage Act. Attempts to
engage in such activities are also prohibited. Id. § 793(b), (c). The full-blown language
lists the national defense information in great detail. For example, section 793 (b) says:
“sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument,
appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense.”
Section 793 also targets any such person who “lawfully having possession of, access to,
control over, or being entrusted with any . . . information relating to the national defense”
either “willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted” the information “to any person not entitled to receive it, or
willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive it.” Id. § 793(d). The same prohibition on
transmitting or withholding information also applies to persons with “unauthorized
possession of, access to, or control over . . . information relating to the national defense
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” Id. § 793(e). Again, attempts
are also unlawful. Id. § 793(e), (d). In short, copying or obtaining national defense
material, or attempting to do so, may pose a problem. Whether a person lawfully or
unlawfully possessed that national defense information, giving or trying to give that
national defense material to a person who is unauthorized to receive it, or withholding it
or trying to withhold it from someone who is authorized to receive it, may violate the
Espionage Act.
“Gross negligence” by anyone “entrusted with” handling national defense information
also violates the law if the information is “removed from its proper place of custody or
delivered to anyone in violation of his trust” or if it is “lost, stolen, abstracted, or
destroyed.” Failure promptly to report such misplacement, loss, or destruction also is
prohibited. Id. § 793(f). This law authorizes fines and/or imprisonment of up to ten years.
Id. Forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from any foreign government” is mandated by this law,
which says that persons convicted under it “shall forfeit.” Id. § 793(h)(1). Under section
794, titled “Gathering or Delivering Defense Information to Aid Foreign Government,”
the stakes are much higher for violators, namely, death. The law says, in part:
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation,
communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate,
deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, . . . information relating
to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 794(a). However, the law says that death will only be imposed if the trier of
fact determines that “the offense resulted in the identification by a foreign power . . . of an
individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of that
individual” or if the offense “directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or
satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation against largescale attack; war plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic information; or any
other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy.” Id. Section 794(b)
uses the word “publishes”:
Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or
communicates . . . information relating to the public defense, which
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might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006). The full-blown language of this section clearly targets troopmovement material. It speaks of publication or communication of “the movement,
numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft,
or war materials of the United States.” Section 794(d) also provides for mandatory
forfeiture. While 794(b) uses the word “publishes,” section 793 uses the terms
“communicates, delivers, transmits.” In the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Douglas wrote
that Section 793 is not applicable to the press. Justice Douglas said, “The Government
suggests that the word ‘communicates’ is broad enough to encompass publication.” But he
points out that three of the sections of the Espionage Act (sections 794, 797 and 798) do
include the word “publishes.” New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720–21
(1971) (Douglas J., concurring, joined by Black, J.). Section 795, titled “Photographing
and sketching defense installations,” prohibits “in the interests of national defense” the
photographing or making of other visual representations of what the President defines as
“vital military and naval installations or equipment.” Violation of this provision only
results in a fine or imprisonment of up to a year, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 795(a)–(b) (2006).
Section 796 prohibits using aircraft to photograph to make other visual representations of
vital installations or equipment, again with a possible fine, imprisonment of up to one
year, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 796 (2006). Section 797 bears the title “Publication and sale of
photographs of defense installation.” Using the term “publication,” as section 794 also
does, clearly puts the press on notice about violating the Espionage Act. Section 797
requires permission from a “commanding officer” prior to publication of photographs or
other visual representation of vital installation, or a fine or imprisonment up to a year, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 797 (2006). Section 798, titled “Disclosure of classified information,”
applies to “Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign
government to the detriment of the United States any classified information.” 18 U.S.C. §
798(a) (2006). Note that this section applies both to communication and to publication of
classified information. As for a general definition of “classified information,” it means
“information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national
security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or
restricted dissemination or distribution.” 18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (2006). Classified
information includes “any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or
any foreign government” or information about the design of devices used for
“cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes,” as well as “communication
intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government.” 18 U.S.C. §
798(a)(1)–(3) (2006). Classified information also includes information “obtained by the
processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign
government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes.” Id. § 798(a)(4).
Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate may lawfully demand and
receive classified information. “Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon
lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or
House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof.”
18 U.S.C. § 798(c) (2006). Violation of Section 798 can result in a fine, imprisonment of
up to ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2006). This section also mandates forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 798(d) (2006). On February 10, 2011, Sen. John Ensign, (R-Nev.) introduced
bill S. 315 to amend § 798. Senators Scott P. Brown, (R-Mass.), and Joseph I. Lieberman,
(D-Conn.) co-sponsored the bill. Called “Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing
Lawful Dissemination Act,” or the “Shield Act,” the amendment’s purpose is “to provide
penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain intelligence activities of

46

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:1

necessarily ride a white horse. Morison wanted a job, and he was
willing to break the law, and point the finger at his associates, in order
to get it.
More precisely, the District Court of Maryland convicted Morison
for theft under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and for violating sections of espionage
law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 (d) and (e)—one from the Espionage Act of
1917, which made it unlawful to transmit secret information to
persons who were unauthorized to receive it, and the other from a
1950 addition to the espionage law that made it unlawful to retain
secret information and not give it to persons who were entitled to
59
receive it.
Working at the Naval Intelligence Support Center as an analyst,
Morison had top secret clearance, and the area in which he worked
was closed to everyone but people with top secret clearance. He
agreed not to disclose information and said he understood that
unauthorized disclosures could be a violation of U.S. criminal law.
While off duty, he also worked for Jane’s—a British company that
publishes information on international military operations. Although
the Navy had approved Morison to work for Jane’s, the Navy now
60
wanted him to stop, but Morison wanted to work full time for Jane’s.
Morison started corresponding with Jane’s editor-in-chief and
sending him information. What got him in trouble was that he saw,
sitting on a desk at his Navy workplace, pictures taken by an
American reconnaissance satellite of a Soviet aircraft carrier with
“Secret” and “Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources or Methods
Involved” stamped on their borders. He cut off the borders and sent
the pictures to Jane’s, which published the pictures and made them
available to other news agencies. The Washington Post published one
61
such picture, and Navy officers saw it.

the United States.” See, e.g., Sen. Ensign Introduces Securing Human Intelligence and
Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2011 (containing a
complete copy of the proposed legislation). For commentary on the Espionage Act and
proposed Shield Act, see Jamie L. Hester, The Espionage Act and Today’s ‘High-Tech
Terrorist,’ 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 177 (June 2011). For more on SHIELD Act
language, see infra note 209.
59. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060, 1065 n.9. W. Cory Reiss opines, “Justices Black and
Douglas argued in the Pentagon Papers case that § 793 ‘does not apply to the press.’ Who
may be prosecuted under the Espionage Act for leaked classified material is therefore
unsettled territory.” W. Cory Reiss, Comment, Crime that Plays: Shaping a Reporter’s
Shield to Cover National Security in an Insecure World, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 663
(2009).
60. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060.
61. Id. at 1060–61.
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In the ensuing investigation of the theft, Morison denied any
knowledge of the theft and even told investigators that they should
investigate two of his fellow employees. Investigators gathered
incriminating evidence, including a fingerprint from one of the photos
62
that had been sent to Jane’s. The fingerprint matched Morison’s.
Morison was convicted of theft and violation of espionage law.
On appeal, he argued that espionage law should only apply to “classic
spying and espionage activity”—giving secret information to agents of
foreign governments. Although the statute was clear, Morison
wanted to argue legislative history. The court pointed out that
another section of the Espionage Act, section 764, makes giving
information to foreign agents unlawful, and it carries the death
penalty or up to life in prison. The two sections of the law under
which Morison was convicted carried much lesser maximum penalties
63
of a $ 10,000 fine or 10 years in prison or both.
Morison also raised a First Amendment defense—that unless
there was an exemption for “leaks to the press,” the Espionage Act
violated the First Amendment. The court dismissed this argument.
This was not a prior restraint case, the court said. Further, the First
Amendment does not confer a license on reporters or their news
64
sources to violate valid criminal laws.
Arguably, Morison was not a terribly sympathetic defendant. He
had personal motives for the actions that led to his conviction. On
the other hand, what was troubling about this case for journalists was
the implications of gaining access to something marked “Top Secret”
that contained information that the journalist did not think should be

62. Id. at 1061–62.
63. Id. at 1063–67.
64. Id. at 1068–69. The court also cited Snepp, Marchetti, and the H-bomb cases, as
well as Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Id. at 1068, 70. For coverage of
Branzburg, see infra note 94 to 103 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit cites to
this article: Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National
Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 349, 396–407 (1986), for discussion of
Morison. 844 F.2d at 1066.
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classified and also vital for the American public to know. Morison
66
received a presidential pardon from then-President Bill Clinton.

V. Pearson v. Dodd and Bartnicki v. Vopper
An interesting case that the Fourth Circuit thought inapplicable
67
to Morison’s situation is Pearson v. Dodd. The Morison court said,
“The defendant’s reference to Pearson v. Dodd . . . is misplaced”
because Pearson involved “copying.” As the court pointed out,
“[Morison’s] case does not involve copying; this case involves the

65. Government leakers such as Morison do not garner a great deal of support
among commentators.
For example, Keith Werhan has written: “The pre-9/11
jurisprudence largely denying First Amendment protection to government leakers is
sound. In general, the government’s interest in preserving the secrecy of properly
classified information, the disclosure of which potentially harms the United States,
outweighs the First Amendment interest of a government employee in leaking such
information for press publication.” Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After
9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1597 (2008).
66. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reported on January 23,
2001:
The first person convicted under espionage statutes for leaking
information to the press received a presidential pardon more than 16
years after his arrest. On his last morning in office, former President Bill
Clinton pardoned Samuel Loring Morison, a former Navy intelligence
analyst who was found guilty of providing a British magazine with three
classified satellite photographs. Two months before the Jan. 20 pardon,
Clinton vetoed a bill similar to the law that led to Morison’s conviction.
A provision in the intelligence authorization bill would have permitted
the government to pursue felony charges against leakers of classified
government information, even if the information does not threaten
national security.
Morison, grandson of naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, served two years in prison.
Clinton Pardons Convicted Analyst Who Gave Spy Photos to Media, REPORTERS COMM.
FOR
FREEDOM
OF
THE
PRESS
(Jan.
23,
2001),
http://www.rcfp.org
/newsitems/index.php?i=2659. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was
one of the amici curiae in Morison’s case. 844 F.2d at 1057. For commentary on Ellsberg
and Morison, see Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information: Its Proper
Role and Scope in a Representative Democracy , 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433 (1990). For more
general commentary on the Espionage Act, see Robert D. Epstein, Comment, Balancing
National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why Congress Should Revise the Espionage Act,
15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483 (2007); Mitchell J. Michalec, Note, The Classified
Information Protection Act: Killing the Messenger or Killing the Message?, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 455 (2002/2003) (discussing the Espionage Act and other provisions restricting
information); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973) (discussing the
legislative histories of the Espionage Act of 1917 and its predecessor statute, the Defense
Secrets Act of 1911). See also Hester supra note 58.
67. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, sub nom. Dodd v. Pearson, 395 U.S.
947 (1969).
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actual theft and deprivation of the government of its own tangible
68
property.”
Perhaps Pearson v. Dodd has some application in the WikiLeaks
situation. Bradley Manning engaged in copying. Julian Assange
engaged in copying. Furthermore, The New York Times, The
Guardian, and other newspapers that received the WikiLeaks
documents arguably had “clean hands,” receiving the information
69
without being complicit in its procurement.
As for the facts in Pearson v. Dodd, columnists Drew Pearson and
Jack Anderson published information about the “alleged misdeeds”
of Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd. The columnists obtained the
information from staff members and former employees of the senator
who photocopied some of the senator’s documents from his files.
They gave the columnists the copies but returned the original
70
documents to Dodd’s file cabinets.

68. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077 (citation omitted).
69. Whether Julian Assange himself conspired with Bradley Manning is still a matter
of some contention. Unnamed “military officials” told MSNBC in January 2011 that an
investigation had revealed no “direct connection” between Assange and Manning, and no
evidence that the two had any “direct contact.” See Jim Miklaszewski, NBC: U.S. Can’t
Link Accused Army Private to Assange, MSNBC, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/41241414/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security/. If Assange did not conspire with
Manning, then neither he, nor the newspapers can be guilty of theft or of conversion.
70. In a related case, in 1973, Les Whitten, who worked for Jack Anderson, became
involved in a controversy. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Telephone &
Telegraph, 593 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1978), presented this summary of the Whitten
case:
In November 1972 several hundred American Indians occupied the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs building. The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan
Police Department, Intelligence Section, had an undercover agent inside
the building among the Indians. When the Indians eventually vacated
the building, they purloined and took with them Government property,
including official Government documents. The undercover agent
reported to his Section that the Indians had negotiated with Jack
Anderson, a journalist, for the purchase of some of these stolen
documents and that an Anderson employee was scheduled to receive the
documents at the home of one of the Indian leaders. This information
was passed on to the FBI. The Indian leader’s apartment building was
placed under physical surveillance. At the scheduled time, Mr. Les
Whitten, an Anderson employee, arrived at the apartment and was
subsequently arrested there in apparent possession of the stolen
documents. Mr. Anderson’s and Mr. Whitten’s toll-call records were
subpoenaed to obtain further evidence in the case.
Whitten did not go to jail. See Mark Feldstein, The Jailing of a Journalist: Prosecuting the
Press for Receiving Stolen Documents, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 137, 139 (2005) (covering
prosecution of Les Whitten and also the Pearson v. Dodd case passim).
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The trial court granted Senator Dodd a partial summary judgment
on his claim of conversion. On appeal, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals said that the columnists were not liable
71
under a theory of conversion.
Conversion is “an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another
to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the
72
full value of the chattel.” The appellate court pointed out that the
files were removed, copied, and returned undamaged in the middle of
the night, and thus Senator Dodd was not deprived of their use.
Documents, however, have more than their physical value as “they
may embody information or ideas whose economic value depends in
73
part or in whole upon being kept secret.” “The question here is not
whether [Dodd] had a right to keep his files from prying eyes, but
whether the information taken from those files falls under the
protection of the law of property, enforceable by a suit for
74
conversion. In our view, it does not.” The court went through a
laundry list: none of the information could be construed as literary, as
scientific inventions or as trade secrets. “Nor does it appear to be
information held in any way for sale . . . analogous to the fresh news
75
copy produced by a wire service.”
Although Dodd claimed that the columnists had “aided and
abetted” in the document’s removal, the appellate court said that “the
undisputed facts” only established that the columnists “received
copies of the documents knowing that they had been removed
Feldstein compares Assange’s publishing of leaked material to that of Jack Anderson:
“The parallels between Anderson and Assange are striking,” he says. “Both cultivated
low-level but well-placed whisleblowers to leak documents revealing corruption and deceit
by governments and corporations.” Mark Feldstein, Spreading Leaks Before WikiLeaks,
AMER. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 2010, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?
id=4958.
71. Pearson, 410 F.2d at 703. The trial court did not grant Dodd partial summary
judgment for invasion of privacy. The appellate court said: “It has always been considered
a defense to a claim of invasion of privacy by publication . . . that the published matter
complained of is of general public interest.” The columnists wrote about the senator’s
relationship to some lobbyists for “foreign interests” and also presented “an interpretive
biographical sketch of [Dodd’s] public career.” The columns dealt with Dodd’s
qualifications to serve as a U.S. Senator and thus “amounted to a paradigm example of
published speech not subject to suit for invasion of privacy.” Id.
72. Id. at 706–07 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965)). If
the interference is less severe than conversion, then the tort is “trespass to chattels.” Id. at
707.
73. Id. at 707.
74. Id. at 708.
75. Id.
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without authorization,” and then published excerpts of those
76
documents. This rationale would seem to apply to Assange if his
hands are clean, and also to the newspapers that received information
from him.
The bottom line is that the columnists were spared any liability
for transmitting the information given to them, and the U.S. Supreme
Court let this decision stand.
Likewise, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the U.S. Supreme Court came to
the aid of journalists by ruling against liability for broadcasting
77
illegally recorded phone conversations. The Court struck down a
journalist-unfriendly portion of the federal wiretap law as applied to
the journalist.
Federal wiretap law says that anyone who “willfully intercepts . . .
78
any wire, electronic, or oral communication” has violated the law.
The law goes further: 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) states that it is a crime if
anyone “intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication.” The Supreme Court in Bartnicki struck down this
portion of the wiretap law as a violation of the First Amendment
79
under the circumstances.
In Bartnicki, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a
union, represented teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with
the local school board. The media, of course, covered the
contentious negotiations. The union’s chief negotiator, Bartnicki,
used the cell phone in her car to call the president of the union to
discuss the negotiations. An unidentified person taped the call and
gave a copy to Vopper, a radio commentator critical of the union.
The tape included the president of the union saying, “If they’re not
gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to . . . blow off their
front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those guys.”

76. Id. at 705.
77. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) et seq., quoted in Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 521 n.3.
79. The only question before it, the Court said, was whether applying the law under
circumstances—intentional, unlawful interception, “disclosure of the contents of the
intercepted conversation to . . . representatives of the media, as well as the subsequent
disclosures by the media defendants to the public” by one who at least had reason to know
of the unlawful nature of the interception—would violate the First Amendment. 532 U.S.
at 525.
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80

Vopper aired the tape, violating § 2511(1)(c). Although Vopper did
not participate in the illegal taping, he knew or “had reason to know”
81
that the phone call was illegally intercepted.
In striking down the portion of the wiretap law in question as it
related to Vopper, the Court said that the interception law’s “naked
prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation
of pure speech.” The Court quoted language from the 1979 case of
82
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., saying that “state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
83
constitutional standards.” The Court also cited the 1971 Pentagon
84
Papers case, stating “the Court upheld the right of the press to
publish information of great public concern obtained from documents
stolen by a third party.” The Court continued, explaining:
the attention of every Member of this Court was focused on
the character of the stolen documents’ contents and the
consequences of public disclosure. Although the undisputed
fact that the newspaper intended to publish information
obtained from stolen documents was noted in Justice Harlan’s
dissent . . . neither the majority nor the dissenters placed any
85
weight on that fact.
The Court made clear, however, that the Pentagon Papers case
“did not resolve the question whether, in cases where information has
been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing
86
publication as well.” That question, the Court said, is still open.
That question of whether government may punish the publication
of unlawfully acquired information may well prove to be the
WikiLeaks question. Given the Court’s position that “state officials
80. Id. at 518–19.
81. Id. at 517–18, 525.
82. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (prohibiting punishment of a
newspaper for publication of the name, lawfully obtained, of a juvenile arrested for
allegedly killing a person).
83. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 102). The Court went on to
say “this Court has repeatedly held that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest
order.” Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted).
84. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), covered infra in notes
106 to 120 and accompanying text.
85. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent
87
a need . . . of the highest order,” an answer to whether the
government may punish the publication of unlawfully acquired
information would raise the question of whether the government
could show a need of the highest order in the WikiLeaks case.
Arguing “national security” as a need of the highest order would
seem an obvious route for the government, or “secrecy of
88
information,” as in Snepp.
The Court characterized the question in Bartnicki as: “Where the
punished publisher of information has obtained the information in
question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has
obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing
89
publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?” The
Court answered in the negative and struck down § 2511(1)(c) as it
90
applied to the facts in this case on First Amendment grounds.
In part, the Court reasoned that unlawful conduct is usually
deterred by appropriately punishing the person who broke the law. If
the interception law in question had insufficient sanctions to deter
illegal conduct, then, the Court suggested, maybe the sanctions should
be increased. “But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech
by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order
91
to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”
The Court said that it was balancing the interests between
“privacy of communication” and the First Amendment, and made
clear that its decision in this case did not apply to publication of
87. Id. at 527–28 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), where the Court
denied punishment of a newspaper under a statute forbidding instruments of mass
communication to name rape victims, and Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978), where the Court denied punishment of a newspaper for publishing
truthful information about a confidential proceeding involving the conduct of a judge).
88. Would keeping “state secrets” qualify as a governmental interest of the highest
order? “Secrecy of information” is a “compelling interest,” the Court says in Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1998). One commentator says, “The classic example of
such [‘highest order’] information from Supreme Court dicta is the sailing date of a troop
ship during a time of war. Additional examples might well include the identity of
undercover CIA agents and technical design information for weapons of mass destruction.
Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1597. Another commentator argues, “Even when the
national security damage does not outweigh First Amendment considerations in a given
case, the release of national security information should still only be tolerated when the
objectives of the First Amendment as a tool of democracy are served.” Reiss, supra note
65, at 668-69.
89. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
90. “The constitutional question before us concerns the validity of the statutes as
applied to the specific facts of this case.” Id. at 524.
91. Id. at 529–30.
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private matters such as “trade secrets or domestic gossip.” The Court
explained: “The outcome of the case does not turn on whether §
2511(1)(c) may be enforced with respect to most violations of the
statute without offending the First Amendment. The enforcement of
that provision in this case, however, implicates the core purposes of
the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication
92
Still, the Court
of truthful information of public concern.”
“reiterated its repeated refusal to answer categorically whether
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First
93
Amendment.”
Could the primary question in the WikiLeaks case, then, be
whether the dissemination of its truthful information is of public
concern? After all, the Court stated flatly in Bartnicki, “We think it
clear that . . . a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove
the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
94
concern.”

VI. Branzburg v. Hayes
95

96

In Branzburg v. Hayes, by a narrow 5-4 margin, the U.S.
Supreme Court slammed the door on journalists’ attempts to use the
First Amendment to protect their confidential sources when
97
subpoenaed to appear in front of good-faith grand juries. Indeed,
prior to 1972 and the Branzburg decision, some courts had permitted
journalists to claim First Amendment protection when ordered to
98
reveal their sources before grand juries.

92. Id. at 533–34.
93. Id. at 529.
94. Id. at 535.
95. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
96. With Justice Lewis Powell landing in the middle, some commentators even argue
that Branzburg can be viewed as a 4-1-4 decision. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Panel
Discussion, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in “Reverse
Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1426 (2008); David Rudenstine, Panel
Discussion, A Reporter Keeping Confidences: More Important Than Ever, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1431, 1436 (2008); and C. Edwin Baker, Reclaiming the First Amendment:
Constitutional Theories of Media Reform: The Independent Significance of the Press Clause
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 984 (2007).
97. The Court says that “grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law
enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no
justification.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707–08.
98. For example, in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth
Circuit granted a First Amendment privilege to journalist Earl Caldwell, who was covering
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According to the Supreme Court, “The heart of the claim is that
the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to
disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in
99
obtaining the information.” The Court rejected this claim, while
paying at least some homage to the importance of protecting the
100
press.
Still, the Court seemed to be doing its best to deflate what it
apparently perceived as journalists’ overstated value of their
101
importance. Journalists attempted to claim a “privileged position,”

Black Panther Party activities for The New York Times. Caldwell had received a
subpoena to appear in front of a grand jury. In opposing a motion to quash, the
government had maintained that an officer in the Black Panther Party had threatened to
kill then-president Richard Nixon in a televised speech and that three issues of the
Panther newspaper had repeated that threat. Id. at 676–77. After more legal wrangling
and the expiration of one grand jury and the convening of a new one, Caldwell received a
contempt citation for refusing to appear in front of the grand jury. Id. at 667–68. The
Ninth Circuit, however, granted Caldwell a limited First Amendment privilege. In
Branzburg, the Supreme Court gave the following account of the Ninth Circuit’s decision:
Viewing the issue before it as whether Caldwell was required to appear
before the grand jury at all, rather than the scope of permissible
interrogation, the court first determined that the First Amendment
provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen; in its view,
requiring a reporter like Caldwell to testify would deter his informants
from communicating with him in the future and would cause him to
censor his writings in an effort to avoid being subpoenaed. Absent
compelling reasons for requiring his testimony, he was held privileged to
withhold it. The court also held, for similar First Amendment reasons,
that, absent some special showing of necessity by the Government,
attendance by Caldwell at a secret meeting of the grand jury was
something he was privileged to refuse because of the potential impact of
such an appearance on the flow of news to the public.
408 U.S. at 679.
99. 408 U.S. at 681.
100. The Court said:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to
the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But
these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior
restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold.
Id.
101. For example, the Court said, “we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his
source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do
something about it.” Id. at 692.
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102

the Court apparently thought. What the high Court did, in effect,
was to level the playing field between journalists and other citizens in
front of grand juries:
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to
respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the
commission of crime.
Citizens generally are not
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional
provision protects the average citizen from disclosing to a
103
grand jury information that he has received in confidence.
The high Court even invoked Jeremy Bentham on the importance
of everyone’s availability to testify in front of grand juries, including
104
royalty subpoenaed to testify about a case involving paupers, and
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion that the President of the United
105
States could be subpoenaed if the circumstances were right.
In short, the Court was emphatic that “the Constitution does not,
as it never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen’s
normal duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the
106
grand jury’s task.”
102. Speaking of the obligation to testify in front of grand juries, the Court said:
The claim is . . . that reporters are exempt from these obligations because
if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose
other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish
newsworthy information in the future. This asserted burden on news
gathering is said to make compelled testimony from newsmen
constitutionally suspect and to require a privileged position for them.
Id. at 682.
103. Id.
104.
Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord
High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimneysweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of
apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think
proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No,
most certainly.
Id. at 688, n.26 (quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320–21 (J. Bowring ed.
1843).
105. 408 U.S. at 688, citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC
Va. 1807).
106. 408 U.S. at 691.
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Justice Stewart decried the Court’s “crabbed view of the First
107
Amendment.”
In the wake of Branzburg, journalists could no longer claim any
privilege in front of grand juries other than the privilege belonging to
everyone, namely, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self108
incrimination.
However, the Court did say that legislators could
fashion privileges for journalists, if the legislators wished.
Perhaps the Court was primarily showing its practical bent: If the
109
privilege, then the Court would
Court granted a journalist
necessarily have to define who fell into the classification of
110
“journalist” and could thus claim the privilege. Defining who falls
into that category is difficult and is arguably becoming even more
111
difficult in the age of the Internet where bloggers abound.
The Branzburg majority expressed the viewpoint that everyone,
journalists included, must obey valid criminal laws. In the Court’s
words: “It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the
112
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”
Nor does the First Amendment grant to the press “a constitutional

107. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 689–90.
109. The Court used the sexist term “newsmen”—for example, in the very first
sentence of the opinion: “The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id.
110.
The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it
would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified
for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional
doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.
Id. at 703–04.
111. The supposed lines delineating journalists blurs further given that social media
allow its users to quickly and easily commit “random acts of journalism.” Twitter users
were among the first to post pictures of the 2009 US Airways flight that landed safely in
the Hudson River. More recently, a Twitter user in Abbottabad, Pakistan, unknowingly
posted live updates of the U.S. Special Forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden. See
Matthew Ingram, Does Posting Things to Twitter Make You a Journalist?, GIGAOM (May
5, 2011, 4:04 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/05/05/does-posting-things-to-twitter-make-youa-journalist/.
112. 408 U.S. at 682.
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right of special access to information not available to the public
113
generally.”
The Branzburg Court even addresses the issue of stealing
documents:
Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could
provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source
is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the
impact on the flow of news. Neither is immune, on First
Amendment grounds, from testifying against the other, before
the grand jury or at a criminal trial. The Amendment does
not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in
ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights
of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to
114
all other persons.
The Court thus made its viewpoint clear: First Amendment
arguments wither when confronted with valid laws of “general
applicability.”

VII. The Danger of Applying Branzburg’s Logic to Bartnicki
and New York Times v. United States
What if the Court in Bartnicki had followed the doctrine that
journalists must follow rules of general applicability, namely, that it is
a crime to receive stolen property? In other words, what if the Court
in Bartnicki had applied Branzburg-type logic?
Under a Branzburg-type analysis, Vopper’s actions would fall
under the ambit of the generally applicable rule that receiving stolen
property is a crime and, therefore, Vopper’s receipt of the tape would
be a criminal act and punishable.
Further, the Pentagon Papers case would have to be decided
differently using Branzburg’s logic. The Bartnicki Court characterized the Pentagon Papers case as upholding “the right of the press to
publish information of great public concern obtained from documents
115
stolen by a third party.”
The Pentagon Papers case started in early 1971 when a reporter
from The New York Times received a photocopy of the secret 47volume study of the history of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the
113. Id. at 684.
114. Id. at 692.
115. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).

2011]

LEAKS, LEAKERS, AND JOURNALISTS

59

116

so-called Pentagon Papers. This study was prepared by the Defense
Department, which had not planned for the papers to be made
117
public.
But Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon employee and one of
118
the study’s thirty-six authors, had turned against the war. He
slipped a copy of the Pentagon Papers to a New York Times
119
reporter. A team of reporters worked for three months. Then, on

116. According to Circuit Judge MacKinnon on June 23, 1971, “Our ability to deal
effectively with the problem is also currently complicated today by the release of the
entire 47 volumes to Congress where the problem of disclosure may be compounded.”
United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971). According to
Justice Burger, “[T]he Times conducted its analysis of the 47 volumes of Government
documents over a period of several months and did so with a degree of security that a
government might envy.” N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 749 n.1 (1971)
(Burger, J., dissenting). But Floyd Abrams says Ellsberg made 43 volumes available:
In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg decided to make available to the New York
Times (and then to other newspapers) 43 volumes of the Pentagon
Papers, the top-secret study prepared for the Department of Defense
examining how and why the United States had become embroiled in the
Vietnam conflict. But he made another critical decision as well. That
was to keep confidential the remaining four volumes of the study
describing the diplomatic efforts of the United States to resolve the war.
Not at all coincidentally, those were the volumes that the government
most feared would be disclosed.
Floyd Abrams, Why WikiLeaks is Unlike the Pentagon Papers, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Dec. 29, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020452780457604402039660
1528.html.
117. The National Archives released an official, declassified version of the Pentagon
Papers in June 2011. It is almost a complete version of the original report: Eleven words
remain redacted.
See A.J. Daverede, The Real Pentagon Papers, NAT’L
DECLASSIFICATION CTR (NDC) BLOG (May 26, 2011), http://blogs.archives.gov/
ndc/?p=138.
118. Leslie H. Gelb, The Way Out of Afghanistan, DAILY BEAST, (Aug. 1, 2010, 6:58
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/08/01/gelb-pentagon-papers-and-wikileaks.
html.
119. Comparing the ease of Manning’s transfer of information to Julian Assange in
2010 with the difficulty of Daniel Ellsberg’s copying and smuggling 47 volumes of hardcopy Pentagon Papers to a New York Times reporter in 1971 makes clear how easy
technology has made the transmission of massive amounts of information. So does
comparing the ease with which Julian Assange made information available to the whole
world to the relatively limited transmission of chunks of Pentagon Papers information to
readers of The New York Times, Washington Post, and other newspapers. The age of the
Internet is clearly a new age for information acquisition and transmission. The
transformation is perhaps like that from conventional warfare to the atomic age, with
massive fallout on a global scale: the information “bomb” goes off and radiates worldwide
almost instantaneously. WikiLeaks’ “leaks became a torrent,” Scott Shane says. He
states:
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Traditional watchdog journalism, which has long accepted leaked
information in dribs and drabs, has been joined by a new counterculture
of information vigilantism that now promises disclosures by the terabyte.
A bureaucrat can hide a library’s worth of documents on a key fob, and
scatter them over the Internet to a dozen countries during a cigarette
break.
Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010 at WK1. In response,
he says, the Defense Department is cutting back on sharing information, stripping
computers of their CD and DVD recorders, requiring two people instead of just one for
huge downloads of information from a classified to an unclassified computer, and
installing software that can detect unusually large downloads. Id. The Internet also briefly
buzzed at claims that Daniel Ellsberg calls Julian Assange his “reincarnation.” See, e.g.,
Webster G. Tarpley, Wikileaks Is The “Cognitive Infiltration” Operation Demanded by
Cass Sunstein, DPROGRAM.NET (Jan. 22, 2010), http://dprogram.net/2011/01/22/wikileaksis-the-%E2%80%9Ccognitive-infiltration%E2%80%9D-operation-demanded-by-cass-sun
stein-webster-g-tarpley/.
A California court of appeals in 2006 put a positive spin on digital communication and
how availability of source material will reduce editorial spin:
Digital communication and storage, especially when coupled with
hypertext linking, make it possible to present readers with an unlimited
amount of information in connection with a given subject, story, or
report. The only real constraint now is time—the publisher’s and the
reader’s . . . Courts ought not to cling too fiercely to traditional
preconceptions, especially when they may operate to discourage the
seemingly salutary practice of providing readers with source materials
rather than subjecting them to the editors’ own “spin” on a story.
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The same would
seem to apply to source material reducing government’s spin. For example, on February
4, 2011, The Daily Telegraph of London reported, “The US secretly agreed to give the
Russians sensitive information on Britain’s nuclear deterrent to persuade them to sign a
key treaty, The Daily Telegraph can disclose.” The source? U.S. diplomatic communiques
posted on WikiLeaks. The Telegraph did not stop with its story but also gave interested
readers the raw information: “Details of the behind-the-scenes talks are contained in more
than 1,400 US embassy cables published to date by the Telegraph, including almost 800
sent from the London Embassy, which are published online today.” See Matthew Moore,
Gordon Raynor & Christopher Hope, WikiLeaks cables: US Agrees to Tell Russia Britain’s
Nuclear Secrets, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
wikileaks/8304654/WikiLeaks-cables-US-agrees-to-tell-Russia-Britains-nuclearsecrets.html. See also Nile Gardiner, The Obama Administration Betrays Britain to
Appease the Russians Over New START, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 2011,
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100074846/the-obama-administration-betraysbritain-to-appease-the-russians-over-new-start. The Bangkok Post reported: “For those
seeking to better understand the events in Egypt, by far the best source of information is
WikiLeaks. The huge release of cables from the US embassy in Cairo offer fascinating
insights and background into the drama unfolding in Tahrir.” Fascinating and disturbing,
if one agrees with the position of the Bangkok paper: “[T]he cables show how Arab and
Islamic leaders have allowed themselves to be made complete fools, why their peoples are
rising up to say that enough is enough and why that political tsunami will strike many
shores right across the world.” See Imtiaz Mugbil, WikiLeaks: Clues to a Failed U.S.
Policy, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 6, 2011, http:// www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/220085/
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June 13, 1971, a Sunday, The New York Times printed on the front
120
page its first story based on the Pentagon Papers. The New York

wikileaks-clues-to-a-failed-us-policy. And WikiLeaks has been given the credit or blame,
depending on one’s attitude, for the revolutions in the Middle East. See, e.g, Maha
Azzam, Opinion: How WikiLeaks helped fuel Tunisian revolution, CNN, Jan. 18, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/opinion/tunisia.wikileaks _1_tunisians-wikileaks-regime;
Robert Mackey, Quaddafi Sees WikiLeaks Plot in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011,
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/qaddafi-sees-wikileaks-plot-in-tunisia/;
Ian
Black, Tunisia: The WikiLeaks Connection, GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/15/tunisia-wikileaks-ghannouchi.
Assange himself
said WikiLeaks was responsible in part for the regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia. See
Wikileaks’ Julian Assange takes credit for Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, DAILY MAIL
(Feb. 14, 2011, 3:23 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356754/WikileaksJulian-Assange-takes-credit-Tunisian-Egyptian-revolutions.html#ixzz1JniuB74Zntstu.
Even former Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi joined in. See Matthew Weaver,
Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising, GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 16, 2011, 1:07 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.
Abroad, the WikiLeaks flap in part is seen as curious. While Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton called the diplomatic leaks “not just an attack on America—it’s an attack on the
international community,” from Paris came this report: “For many Europeans,
Washington’s fierce reaction to the flood of secret diplomatic cables released by
WikiLeaks displays imperial arrogance and hypocrisy, indicating a post-9/11 obsession
with secrecy that contradicts American principles.” See Scott Neuman, Clinton:
WikiLeaks ‘Tear at Fabric’ of Government, NPR.ORG, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.npr.org/
2010/11/29/131668950/white-house-aims-to-limit-wikileaks-damage; Steven Erlanger,
Many Europeans Find U.S. Attacks on WikiLeaks Puzzling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at
12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/europe/10wikileaks-react.html.
One comment in this article came from the Berliner Zeitung: “The U.S. is betraying one of
its founding myths: freedom of information. And they are doing so now, because for the
first time since the end of the cold war, they are threatened with losing worldwide control
of information.” On the other hand, a reporter for Le Figaro, Renauti Girard, opined:
“What is most fascinating is that we see no cynicism in U.S. diplomacy. They really
believe in human rights in Africa and China and Russia and Asia. They really believe in
democracy and human rights. People accuse the Americans of double standards all the
time. But it’s not true here. If anything, the diplomats are almost naive, and I don’t think
these leaks will jeopardize the United States. Most will see the diplomats as honest,
sincere and not so cynical.” Id. But WikiLeaks did leak hundreds of thousands of classified documents concerning U.S. wars. And Assange has shown himself capable of using
information offensively, threatening to dump unredacted material if the United States
attempts to prosecute him and, separately, to release information about major banks. See,
e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A WikiLeak Problem for Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010
at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E1D71639F932
A15751C1A9669D8B63; Ian Drury, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange ‘will release poison
pill of damaging secrets if killed or arrested,’ DAILY MAIL, Dec. 6, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1335888/WikiLeaks-Julian-Assange-release-damagingsecrets-killed-arrested.html.
120. On the top-center of the front page of The New York Times appeared a story
three columns wide by Neil Sheehan titled “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3
Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement.” In a small box at the top of the middle column
appeared these words: “Three pages of documentary material from the Pentagon study
begin on Page 35.” According to Sheehan’s story, the Pentagon Papers are composed of a
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Times also made Pentagon Papers information available to other
121
newspapers.
Less than forty-eight hours later, The New York Times received a
telegram from U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell, saying that any
more articles based on the Pentagon Papers would bring about
122
“irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States.”
Columnist James Reston summed up the situation: “For the first time
in the history of the Republic, the Attorney General of the United
States has tried to suppress documents he hasn’t read about a war
123
that hasn’t been declared.”
The Justice Department asked U.S. District Court Judge Murray
Gurfein to issue a temporary restraining order against The New York
Times. Interestingly, it was Judge Gurfein’s first day on the job as a
124
federal judge. He granted the temporary restraining order on June
15, but on June 19, Judge Gurfein refused to give the government a
preliminary injunction. He said:
These are troubled times. There is no greater safety valve for
discontent and cynicism about the affairs of Government than
freedom of expression in any form. This has been the genius
of our institutions throughout our history. It is one of the
marked traits of our national life that distinguish us from
125
other nations under different forms of government.

“3,000 page analysis, to which 4,000 pages of official documents are appended,” and
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commissioned the study.
121. For example, on June 14, the day after The New York Times published its first
story on the Pentagon Papers, the Louisville Courier Journal said: “Dateline: Washington:
The White House has no copy of the highly secret governmental history of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam. Excerpts were published yesterday in The New York Times and
made available through its news service to newspapers nationwide, including the CourierJournal.”
122. Max Frankel, Court Step Likely, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1971, at 1.
123. The Pentagon Papers: A Public Domain Reminder: US Lies and Deception, ASK
WHY!, May 15, 2003, at 20 available at www.askwhy.co.uk/warandpropaganda/
pentagonpapers.pdf (last visited June 5, 2011).
124. See, e.g., Cover Story: Pentagon Papers, The Secret War, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/back.time/9606/28/index.shtml; Top Secret:
The Battle for the Pentagon Papers, www.topsecretplay.org/index.php/content/timeline,
and The Nation: The Legal Battle Over Censorship, TIME MAGAZINE, June 28, 1971,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905236,00.html.
125. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
demanding further hearings and enjoining publication of more
126
Pentagon Papers stories by the Times.
On June 26, only thirteen days after The New York Times
published its first story on the Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court
heard the case, and the Court reached its decision four days later.
The Supreme Court issued a three-paragraph-long per curiam
decision. All nine justices wrote separate opinions, with three justices
dissenting. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court lifted the
injunction on The New York Times. The Court said, “Any system of
prior restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
127
presumption against its constitutional validity.” John Mitchell and
the Department of Justice were not able to meet that heavy burden.
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, saying, “The
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information. . . . [A] debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation
over our posture in Vietnam. Open debate and discussion of public
128
issues are vital to our national health.” Justice Douglas seems to be
saying that instead of being a risk to national security, the publishing
of the Pentagon Papers was “vital” to national security. He
acknowledged that “[t]hese disclosures may have a serious impact,”

126. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1970). On June 18,
the Washington Post got into the act, publishing parts of the Pentagon Papers. The Justice
Department got a TRO against the Washington Post, as well, but Judge Gerhard Gesell,
the district court judge, denied a preliminary injunction. On June 23, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia heard the United States’ appeal from the district
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the Post. When the issue came before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Pentagon claimed that
publication would betray a national security secret. After Judge David Bazelon called
attorneys for both sides, and one Post reporter, into his chambers to ask what secret would
be betrayed. The Pentagon identified the “secret” as the fact that the American military
had broken the code of the North Vietnamese navy. But the reporter, George Wilson,
reached into his green vinyl bag and located a passage from a Congressional hearing that
disclosed that the government had already made the alleged secret public during a Senate
investigation of the 1964 naval incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. See EDMUND B. LAMBETH,
COMMITTED JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC FOR THE PROFESSION, 156 (2d ed. 1992). See also
United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court ruled in
favor of the Post and against an injunction. Id. at 1328.
127. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
128. Id. at 723–24, (Douglas J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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but he said “that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on the
129
press.”
Justice Black in his concurrence extolled the virtues of the
Founding Fathers, saying that with the First Amendment, they
provided the needed protection for the press to fill its “essential role”
in democracy. He explained that “[t]he press was to serve the
governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare
130
the secrets of government and inform the people.”
The duty of the press for Justice Black could be boiled down,
perhaps, to two words: exposing deception. He said that “[o]nly a
free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.” But what about exposing deception when national
security is arguably at issue? He seems to be saying that if the issue is
war, then the press must expose deception: “And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
131
distant lands to die.”
Justice Black could hardly have been more complimentary to the
newspapers involved in the leak of the Pentagon Papers to the
American public:
In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their
courageous reporting, The New York Times, The Washington
Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving
the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam
war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the
132
Founders hoped and trusted they would do.
Had Branzburg’s reasoning held sway with the Pentagon Papers,
the Court would have applied the general rule of applicability
concerning the criminality of receiving stolen property and ruled
against The New York Times and The Washington Post. The Court

129. Id. at 722–23. Justice Douglas also argued the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. §
793, concluding that no statute existed to bar publication of the Pentagon Papers material.
Id. at 720–21.
130. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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would have constricted the free flow of information and changed
history—much for the worse.
The Branzburg doctrine of applying rules of general applicability
(“Thou shalt not receive stolen property”) was mercifully ignored by
the Court in Bartnicki and the Pentagon Papers case, as it arguably
should have been in Branzburg. But would the Branzburg rules-ofgeneral-applicability doctrine be applied in a WikiLeaks case?
The government was able to get Daniel Ellsberg and one of his
cohorts indicted under federal espionage, theft, and conspiracy laws,
but no conviction ensued. The trial judge looked at the “totality of
the circumstances” of the trial and thought that there was improper
133
government conduct. The judge declared a mistrial.
On June 13, 2011, forty years to the day after The New York
Times printed its first story based on the Pentagon Papers, the U.S.
134
government released the Pentagon Papers for public consumption.

VIII. Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman; Risen and Lichtblau;
Drake and Sterling
In January 2006, Lawrence Franklin, who worked for the
Department of Defense, received a 150-month sentence for violating
135
the Espionage Act. He pleaded guilty to two counts. Franklin had
been indicted along with two other Department of Defense officials,
Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman. Rosen was the Director of
Foreign Policy Issues at the American Israeli Public Affairs
Committee (“AIPAC”), while Weissman was the Senior Middle East
Analyst for AIPAC’s Foreign Policy Issues Department. Rosen and
Weissman did not plead guilty.
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made a ruling in the
136
series of cases known as United States v. Rosen. The cases began in

133. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS 242, 274 (1972); On
government improprieties as the grounds for the dismissal in the Ellsberg case, see
Transcribed Remarks of the Honorable Stephen Trott, Perspectives on Watergate Panel:
Memories of the Ellsberg Break-In, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (2000) (excellent coverage of
the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and Ellsberg’s release).
134. See, e.g., Calvin Woodward & Richard Lardner, Pentagon Papers Released 40
Years After New York Times Began Publishing Them, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011,
9:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/pentagon-papers-released-_n_875748.
html.
135. United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 194 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009). See also, Scott
Shane & David Johnston, Pro-Israel Lobbying Group Roiled by Prosecution of Two ExOfficials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at 21.
136. 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
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2006 with a ruling by the Eastern District Court of Virginia that 18
U.S.C. § 793, as applied to Rosen and Weissman, was not
137
unconstitutionally vague.
A grand jury had indicted Rosen and
Weissman, along with Franklin, in August 2005 for unlawful
transmission of national defense information from government
sources to AIPAC, foreign officials, and news media from 1999 to
2004.
138
Applying the Classified Information Procedures Act, the trial
139
court made an evidentiary ruling on classified information.
The
court concluded that an FBI report was relevant to Rosen and
Weissman’s defense. While the defendants wanted to use the whole
report, the government wanted to redact the report, maintaining that
portions of it were irrelevant. According to the appellate court, the
trial court “proposed redactions in painstaking detail,” agreeing with
the government that some redactions were necessary but that some
would impede the defendants’ in preparing their defense. In so
ruling, the appellate court said, the trial court did not abuse its
140
A “classified information privilege,” claimed by the
discretion.
government, must yield if the classified information “is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
141
determination of a cause.”
In 2009, the U.S. government dropped charges against Rosen and
Weissman for conspiring with Franklin to transmit government
secrets. The two lobbyists had gained court permission to subpoena
high-ranking government officials, including then-Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, to explore the defense allegation that government
officials frequently pass classified information to foreign
142
governments.
137. United States v. Rosen, 444 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Va. 2006).
138. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16.
139. 557 F.3d at 194–95.
140. Id. at 200.
141. Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
142. See Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government’s Ability
to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession of Publication of National Security Information,
13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 447 (2008) (covering the prosecution under Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for
possession and dissemination of national security information); Heidi Kitrosser, Classified
Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2008); Joe Bant, Comment,
United States v. Rosen: Pushing the Free Press onto a Slippery Slope? 55 KAN. L. REV. 1027
(2007); Peter Shapiro, Note, “Prologue to a Farce?” A Historical Perspective on the AIPAC
Case and the Applicability of the Espionage Act to Journalists, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y
& ETHICS J. 237 (2007) (The AIPAC case is the Rosen case). For coverage of the Franklin
affair, see William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for
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According to Heidi Kitrosser, there is a link between the case
involving Rosen and Weissman and the later National Security
Agency leak case involving two New York Times reporters. She said
the Rosen and Weissman case reflected “a broader trend toward
cracking down on classified information leaks” by the Bush
administration, which maintained that the Espionage Act authorized
prosecution not only of government employees for leaking classified
information but also of other people, including journalists, who
transmitted the information or even just received it. The convening
of a grand jury to investigate leaks about the National Security
Agency’s classified program of warrantless spying on phone calls,
143
Kitrosser says, is yet another example of this crackdown.
The more recent skirmish between the government and the
reporters who published stories about NSA leaks involved James
Risen and Eric Lichtblau of The New York Times. Late in 2005, they
reported that the NSA was violating U.S. law by eavesdropping on
U.S. citizens without getting the warrants required by the Foreign
144
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Commentator Keith Werhan says that the Pentagon Papers case
has a “strong default rule making prior restraints on national security
grounds next to impossible,” and he uses the Risen-Lichtblau story as
an example of the strength of this alleged default rule. According to
Werhan, government officials met with Times editors to try to
persuade them to spike the story. The government got the story
delayed for a year, pushing its publication after the 2004 presidential
elections, and the Times did delete some information. The published

Newsgathering Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 129, 130–32 (2002). See the Lee article, passim,
for coverage of the general topic of the complex relationship between reporters and their
confidential sources. See also, William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources,
and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (2008); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role
of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 425 (2006); Rick Karr, Rick Karr on Government Secrecy (PBS broadcast on Feb.
28, 2008), available at http:// www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02292008/profile4.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2011) (covering the federal grand jury investigation against Risen and
Lichtblau).
143. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 883–84 .
144. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.
In May 2011, Congress passed a four-year extension to parts of the controversial
PATRIOT Act that address surveillance techniques that were set to expire. Paul Kane &
Felicia Sonmez, Congress approves extension of USA Patriot Act provisions, WASH. POST.,
May 27, 2011, http://www. washingtonpost.com/AGGgXICH_story.html.
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story said that it omitted “some information that administration
145
officials argued could be useful to terrorists.”
The Risen and Lichtblau story, as well as a Washington Post story
published six weeks earlier by Dana Priest about the CIA’s prisons
overseas that used “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as
146
waterboarding, won Pulitzer Prizes. The Bush administration
denounced both stories as compromising the government’s war on
147
terrorism. Instead of apologizing for breaching Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act law, President Bush called the leak about the
warrantless surveillance “a shameful act.” Some critics even said that
148
The New York Times had committed treason.
While no indictments were ever handed down against Risen and
Lichtblau, Thomas A. Drake was not so lucky. Drake, a former NSA
senior executive, was indicted. According to information released by
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, a grand jury in the District of
Maryland charged that Drake was the source for newspaper articles
about the NSA published between February 2006 and November
2007.
The indictment alleged that, among other things, he engaged in
the following activities to provide highly classified information to a
reporter:
exchanging hundreds of e-mails with and meeting with the
reporter; . . . copying and pasting classified and unclassified
information from NSA documents into untitled word
145. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1574 (quoting Risen & Lichtblau, supra note
144).
146. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov, 2,
2005, at A1.
147. See Laura Rozen, Hung Out to Dry: The National-Security Press Dug Up the Dirt,
but Congress Wilted, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://
www.cjr.org/transparency/hung_out_to_dry_1.php?page=all.
148. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and
National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 235–36 (2008); see also Werhan, supra note
65, at 1561, 1574 (calling the story a “shameful act”). President Bush also said that the
story was “helping the enemy,” and a Congressional resolution condemning The New
York Times for possible endangerment of American lives garnered 210 votes. Id. at 1574–
75.
On wiretapping done by presidents, and particularly by President George W. Bush, see
generally, Heidi Kitrosser, Symposium, Law at the Intersection of National Security,
Privacy, and Technology: It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010). See also Robert M. Chesney, National
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (exploring whether judges should
defer to the executive branch on facts in national security cases).
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processing documents which, when printed, had the
classification markings removed; . . . scanning and emailing
electronic copies of classified and unclassified documents to
the reporter from his home computer; and reviewing,
commenting on, and editing drafts of the reporter’s articles.
According to Breuer, Drake shredded documents and lied to
federal agents. Because of national security needs, Breuer said,
Drake’s disclosure of classified information warranted that he be
149
“prosecuted vigorously.”
Drake was scheduled to go on trial in June 2011. He defended
himself publicly in a May 2011 The New Yorker article:
“I’m a target,” he said. “I’ve got a bull’s-eye on my back.” He
continued, “I did not tell secrets. I am facing prison for having
raised an alarm, period. I went to a reporter with a few key
things: fraud, waste, and abuse, and the fact that there were
legal alternatives to the Bush Administration’s ‘dark side’—in
150
particular, warrantless domestic spying by the N.S.A.”
But instead of going to trial or to jail, he pled guilty to a single
misdemeanor charge of exceeding authorized use of a government
computer, in order to share that computer’s contents with persons
unauthorized to receive the shared information.
Under the
agreement, Drake would receive no jail time. Originally, the
government had sought conviction on ten felony charges, including
151
violating the Espionage Act. In short, the “vigorous prosecution”
152
seemed to fizzle out. On July 15, 2011, Drake received a sentence
149. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Former NSA Senior
Executive Charged with Illegally Retaining Classified Information, Obstructing Justice and
Making False Statements, (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/April/10-crm-416.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
150. See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46, 48.
Mayer named the reporter as Siobhan Gorman of the Baltimore Sun. According to
Mayer, Gorman “has not been charged with wrongdoing.”
151. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, A Deal in the N.S.A. Case, NEW YORKER, June 9, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/06/a-deal-in-the-nsa-case.html.
152. The Washington Post quoted Jesselyn Radack, the director of national security
for the Government Accountability Project, as saying of the plea agreement that “It’s an
unambiguous victory for Drake” and that “The prosecution’s case imploded.” Ellen
Nakashima, Ex-NSA Official Thomas Drake to Plead Guilty to Misdemeanor, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/ex-nsamanager-has-reportedly-twice-rejected-plea-bargains-in-espionage-act-case/2011/06/09/
AG89ZHNH_story.html. Smithsonian Magazine also quoted Radack as saying that
President Obama’s Administration “has brought more leak prosecutions than all previous

70

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:1

of one year on probation and 240 hours of community service from
United States Judge Richard D. Bennett, who from the bench
rebuked the government and called it “unconscionable” for the
government to put Drake and his family through “four years of hell”
153
before folding on all felony charges. On December 22, 2010, former
CIA agent Jeffrey Sterling was indicted by a federal grand jury in St.
Louis for allegedly giving classified information to a journalist about a
secret endeavor to impede weapon development by some foreign
countries. Sterling was arrested in St. Louis on January 6. Although
the indictment does not specifically say that Sterling was passing
secret information to journalist James Risen, the details led The New
York Times to conclude that Risen received information from
Sterling that then appeared in Risen’s 2006 book, State of War: The
154
Secret History of the C.I.A. and the Bush Administration.
Federal District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema quashed a subpoena
for journalist Risen in November 2010, but prosecutors subpoenaed
155
him again in May 2011. According to Justice Department rules,
prosecutors can only seek information from journalists if the
information is both essential and cannot be gained in any other
156
Federal prosecutors were able to indict Sterling without
manner.
presidential administrations combined.” David Wise, Leaks and the Law: The Story of
Thomas Drake, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, Aug. 2011, available at http://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Leaks-and-the-Law-The-Story-of-ThomasDrake.html. She introduced Thomas Drake when he received the $10,000 Ridenhour
Prize for Truth-Telling from the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. in April 2011.
Id. As President-elect, President Obama also had praised government whistleblowers,
speaking of the “courage and patriotism” of whistle-blowing and saying it “should be
encouraged rather than stifled.” Id.
153. See, e.g., Tricia Bishop, No Jail Time for Ex-NSA Official; Thomas Drake,
Accused of Espionage, Gets Probation After Case Collapses, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July
16, 2011, at 1A. See also Scott Shane, Ex-N.S.A. Official Takes Plea Deal; Setback for
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2011, at 1. In a case that received relatively little publicity,
Shamai K. Leibowitz, a lawyer who worked as a Hebrew translator for the FBI on a
contract basis, pleaded guilty to leaking classified documents to an unnamed blogger.
Maria Glod, Former FBI Employee Sentenced in Classified Leak, WASH. POST, May 25,
2010 at B03 [hereinafter FBI Employee Sentenced]. See also Wise, supra note 152, and
Shane, supra note 152. Although U.S. District Judge Alexander Williams, Jr., said during
the sentencing that government authorities persuaded him that this case involved a “very,
very serious offense,” he also said that “I don’t know what was divulged, other than some
documents, and I don’t know how it’s compromised things.” See FBI Employee Sentenced.
154. See Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at 15 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07indict.html.
155. Ellen Nakashima, Reporter Subpoenaed in Leaks Case, WASH. POST., May 24,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/reporter-subpoenaed-in-leaks-case/2011/05/
24/AFV2MiAH_story.html.
156. Since 1980, prosecutorial guidelines have existed to help curb overzealous pursuit
of journalists’ sources. Published in the Code of Federal Regulations, the guidelines

2011]

LEAKS, LEAKERS, AND JOURNALISTS

71

Risen disclosing him as a source. The indictment includes details of
phone conversations and e-mail exchanges between Sterling and the
157
unnamed journalist.
Subpoenas on the media are having an impact: the discussion is
158
not just academic. RonNell Andersen Jones rejects the notion that
159
But Jones concludes that
there is an “avalanche” of subpoenas.
there is a problem with subpoenas. In 2006 she conducted a survey
and then compared her data with a comparable survey done in 2001
by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. She stated
that “analysis of the survey data suggests that federal subpoenas may
be both more frequent than they were five years ago and more
160
common than opponents of a federal shield law have suggested.”

explain the rationale for limiting prosecutors’ power over journalists—preserving the
functioning of the press:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of
the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a
reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial
public issues. This policy statement is thus intended to provide protection
for the news media from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or
criminal, which might impair the news gathering function.
28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1980).
157. Savage, supra note 154. In April 2011, a federal prosecutor told Judge Brinkema
that “potential witness issues” might prevent the case from going to trial. The prosecutor
did not describe the problem or say which witness was causing trouble, but the Associated
Press said, “it seems clear that testimony from Risen, who has not cooperated with the
investigation, is key to the government’s case.” See Associated Press, Prosecutor Says
Witness Issue May Prevent Leak Case Against Ex-CIA Officer From Going to Trial,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/prosecutor-leak-caseagainst-ex-cia-man-may-not-go-to-trial-because-of-witness-problem/2011/04/08/AFn2jf2C_
story.html.
Prosecutors in the case took the uncommon step of subpoenaing Sterling’s attorney, Mark
Zaid of Washington, D.C. This brought criticism that this subpoena of prosecutor was
violating Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Conduct that say that
prosecutors may only subpoena an attorney to testify about a client if (1) the prosecutor
does not believe that the information sought is covered by the attorney-client privilege, (2)
the information is “essential,” and (3) there are no alternative sources of the information.
See William H. Freivogel, Feds take Unusual Step of Subpoenaing Sterling’s Lawyer, ST.
LOUIS BEACON, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics /nation /107662sterling-lawyers-subpoena.
158. See RonNell Anderson Jones, Media Subpoenas, Impact, Perception and Legal
Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317 (2009).
159. See Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas
Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 667 (2008).
160. Id. at 637.
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Between 2001 and 2006, federal subpoenas nearly doubled.
Both the 2006 survey and respondents’ comments led Jones to say
that these federal subpoenas are having an “increasing impact” on
newsrooms nationwide. Jones says her work suggests that in 2006
federal subpoenas were served on 10.3 percemt of U.S. media
organizations. Larger media organizations received the brunt of the
subpoenas, with 70 percent of newspaper subpoenas being served on
the 100 largest daily newspapers (out of 1,400) and over half of
broadcaster subpoenas being served in markets of one million or
162
more households.
According to Lucy A. Dalglish, executive director of Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Casey Murray, “Two time
periods . . . stand out for the sheer volume of subpoenas served on the
media—the late 1960s through the early 1970s, when government
officials aggressively went after political groups and others deemed to
be ‘subversive,’ and . . . when the post-9/11 atmosphere caused federal
and state governments to clamp down on the public release of
government information.” They maintain that this “culture of
conspiracy” has resulted in media organizations using more
163
anonymous sources than ever before.

IX. National Security
How valuable is openness in a society? How much openness
should be sacrificed in the name of security? Reaching the
appropriate balance between openness and security is a difficult,
contentious task. Trying to determine the appropriate decision-maker
is also difficult and contentious.
Of course, not everyone agrees with unilateral press decisions to
release information.
Gabriel Schoenfeld in Necessary Secrets:
164
National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law challenges the
press. He favors the government over the press on national security

161. Id. at 638.
162. Id. at 638. Federal subpoenas were served in 32 states and the District of
Columbia. Id.
163. Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Deja Vu All Over Again: How a Generation of
Gains in Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 13, 13 (2006).
164. GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010).
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issues, and his book received some glowing endorsements, even in
165
The New York Times.
Consumer activist and unsuccessful presidential candidate Ralph
Nader decried classification of documents that he says should not
have been classified. He maintains that “there’s just so many things
that have been declassified later, or leaked, that were absurd to [be]
166
classified.”
Heidi Kitrosser arguably goes a step further than Nader, saying
that excessive classification is dangerous. She says that “secrecy often
is at best unnecessary and at worst deeply harmful to national
security.”
Arguably, the need for secrecy is “dramatically
overstated,” she says, and “excessive secrecy hurts national security
by encouraging poorly informed and under-vetted decision-making
and diminishing the United States’ domestic and international
167
credibility.”

165. The New York Times review of Schoenfeld’s book said, in part: “In his aptly titled
book, ‘Necessary Secrets,’ Gabriel Schoenfeld, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, has
presented a subtle and instructive brief challenging the right of the press to make
unilateral decisions to ‘publish and let others perish,’ as he puts it somewhat
tendentiously.” See Alan M. Dershowtiz, Who Needs to Know?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com /2010/05/30/books/review/Dershowitz-t.html.
Another review of Necessary Secrets said this:
In December 2005, The New York Times revealed a secret National
Security Agency operation that spied on Al Qaeda’s communications.
Six months later the Times reported that the U.S. government gained
access to an international financial clearinghouse, which allowed the feds
to track the financial transfers of Al Qaeda. By the Times’s own
accounts, these programs achieved significant successes; but the
disclosure surely compromised that effectiveness. In most countries, the
reporters who broke these stories—Eric Lichtblau and James Risen—
would have been placed in shackles and interred in the deepest dungeon,
along with their editor, Bill Keller. In the United States, they receive
prizes.
Eric A. Posner, The Prudent and the Imprudent, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2010), available
at http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-prudent-and-the-imprudent. Probably very few
people would argue that government has no need for any secrets whatsoever, and those
few might very well also argue that there is no need for government, either. For purposes
of this discussion, an underlying assumption is that government does have some need of
secrecy, although that need can be blown out of all proportion by governments that seek
to govern outside of the view of their citizens and to sweep purely embarrassing
information under the rug of classified information.
166. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 96 (2010) (statement of Ralph
Nader, Legal Advocate and Author).
167. Heidi Kitrosser, Symposium, The Domestic Commander in Chief: Congressional
Oversight of National Security Activities, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2008). See also
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She questions what she calls the “conventional assumption” that
volumes of information exist that would be dangerous in enemy
hands, and says that persons from all political viewpoints have
suggested that the United States unnecessarily classifies a lot of
information. For example, the Solicitor General for Richard Nixon,
Erwin N. Griswold, who fought against publication of the Pentagon
Papers, later acknowledged that he never even saw any suggestion
that the Pentagon Papers endangered national security. Instead, he
spoke of the “massive overclassification” of government information,
contending that “the principal concern of the classifiers is not with
national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of
168
one sort or another.” She also questions the Bush Administration’s
rationale for trying to keep the NSA eavesdropping a secret, referring
to executive “spinning of information” with selective leaks and
169
declassification.
But even Kitrosser says, “It is not remotely unreasonable, of
course, for anyone to wish to block information that could assist
terrorists.” However, she is concerned that there is “massive abuse”
of claims about information aiding terrorism and that there are “very
real risks” to national security and the democratic process from an
170
over-abundance of secrecy. In short, she warns of the “dangers of
171
unchecked government secrecy.”

Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability; Symposium, Presidential
Power in the Obama Administration: Early Reflections, 46 CONST. COMMENTARY, INC.
625 (2010) (discussing the state secrets privilege and court deference to government
arguments for secrecy).
168. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1066.
169. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1067.
170. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1088–89.
171. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1090. This fear of secrecy as dangerous to national
security is echoed by a 2009 note in the Harvard Law Review, but the author also mistrusts
media publication decision-making. “Some secrecy is essential to both national security
and democracy, but excessive secrecy undermines democratic accountability and
decisionmaking, and sometimes national security itself.” The government has an incentive
to keep information secret, while the press benefits from publication of secrets, the note
maintains. Striking the appropriate balance between secrecy and disclosure is not
something the note’s author would trust to government or to the press. The press may
well underestimate national security risks. Note, Media Incentives and National Security
Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228 (2009). The press needs to reform its decision-making
process when trying to determine whether to publish, the note contends. Id. at 2229. In
particular, the note looks askance at “fear of being scooped” as a factor in decisionmaking. Id. at 2237–39. See also Katherine L. Johansen, A Legion of Worries: National
Security Reporting in the Age of the War on Terror 2008, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5107
(2008) (discussing how journalists report national security stories).
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In another article, Kitrosser questions “whether the
Constitution . . . counsels substantial deference to political branch
judgments regarding national security related speech suppression.”
She says “no” because suppression of speech relating to national
security is “more dangerous” than suppression of other types of
172
speech.”
Further, she maintains that “the First Amendment
demands some breathing room for disclosure by those within the vast
secret-keeping infrastructure as well as by the press and the public to
173
whom information might be leaked.”
Protection for leakers seems an increasingly divisive issue in the
days of WikiLeaks. Although she was writing prior to the WikiLeaks
saga, much of Mary-Rose Papandrea’s commentary directly aims at
the issues WikiLeaks raises. She speaks of the “complicated
relationship between the executive branch and the press, particularly
with respect to national security information” and the “virtually
unbridled classification authority” of the executive branch. The
Freedom of Information Act and whistleblower laws are “largely
174
ineffectual” when the issue is national security, she says.
Because national security information is under executive control,
a “game of leaks” has developed, Papandrea claims, between the
government and the press. “During this game, the press alternatively
serves as lapdogs, watchdogs, and scapegoats for the executive
branch. The press depends upon the government for news; the
government in turn depends upon the press to communicate with the
public.” Since Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, she says, leaks have
become a primary method of communicating information, even
classified information, to the public through a compliant press.
Because of its power over information and because of its own leaks,
the executive power to punish the press for publishing leaks should be
“extremely limited,” she says: The government should have to prove
intent or reckless disregard for harm to the United States by
175
publishing leaks.

172. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 881, 885.
173. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 885–86.
174. See CIA v. Sims, discussed supra note 20.
175. Papandrea, supra note 148, at 236–37. See also Derigan A. Silver, National
Security and the Press The Government’s Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the
Possession of Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 447, 447
(2008) (arguing that Congress should amend federal law “to limit prosecution to instances
when there is evidence of intent to harm the United States”). For more on government
secrets, see also GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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Keith Werhan agrees with Papandrea on limiting the executive
power to punish the press for leaks. He says, “There are few
absolutes in constitutional jurisprudence, and there surely are
extraordinary circumstances in which the principle of press autonomy
(like every other fundamental right) should be overridden by
176
competing social costs.”
Preventing a terrorist attack or other such deadly violence is an
example of an extraordinary circumstance justifying a government
subpoena of the press. But without such circumstances, Werhan says,
he does not think prosecutors can justify subpoenaing the press even
if necessary to reveal a “government leaker.” He says, “The leaking
of classified information is an everyday occurrence, and the necessity
of a journalist’s testimony to prove the case against a government
leaker beyond reasonable doubt likely would be the rule rather than
177
the exception.”
Werhan would countenance criminal prosecution for publication
of classified information if prosecution furthered “a state interest of
178
He mentions the “extreme security risks” of
the highest order.”
publishing sailing dates of ships transporting troops, or technical
information for designing weapons of mass destruction, or
179
undercover CIA agents’ identities.
Rodney A. Smolla echoes the “watchdog” theme. He says:
There should be no per se “carve out” for national security
matters. We live at a time in American history in which the
watchdog role of a free and aggressive press is more vital than
ever, and that watchdog role must above all include the vital
and historic role of the press as a check and balance on the
actions of the national government in matters relating to
national security and foreign affairs.
To ensure a balance between “truly important national security
secrets” and the watchdog press, Smolla calls for “qualified
protection” for confidentiality promises by newsgatherers. But he

176. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1604. Werhan explains, “I am not a First
Amendment absolutist. Not many people are. There are circumstances in which our rights
to free speech and a free press must give way to competing societal interests. National
security can be such an interest, but it is not inevitably so.” Id. at 1592.
177. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1604–05.
178. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1594 (citing the “Daily Mail principle”); see also Smith,
supra note 82.
179. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1594.
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tips the balance in favor of national security. Although he does not
want a “blanket exception” for national security interests, he does say
that national security would usually trump privilege—with the caveat
that “we should preserve the possibility that the invocation of the
national security interest would be overridden by courts when it is a
180
sham.”
David Rudenstine argues in favor of extending shield law
protection in alleged matters of national security. Although he also
wrote prior to the WikiLeaks situation, his argument also seems
highly applicable to it. He rails against the “enormous shift” of power
to the executive branch in matters concerning national security and
181
the danger created by secret use of power.
This vast, secretly exercised power creates a “direct threat” to
democratic government, Rudenstine says. He strongly supports
shield law, maintaining that confidential sources are a necessity for
reporting about national security matters. Why? “[B]ecause almost
all information pertinent to national security is classified, thus
preventing those with lawful access to it from revealing it to the press.
It is only because some individuals do make such information public
182
that we have access to it.”
While Anthony Lewis flatly states that “the press does not always
have right and justice on its side,” he values protecting confidential
sources. He cites The New York Times’ NSA story, calling it “vitally
important” because it shed light on “lawless executive activity,” as
well as The Washington Post’s story on CIA interrogations in secret
European prisons. Lewis contends that “[n]either of those stories
could have been reported without the use of confidential sources.

180. Smolla, supra note 96, at 1423, 1430.
181. Rudenstine presents a laundry list of secret uses of executive power:
[S]ince 9/11, the executive has, without public disclosure and debate,
engaged in eavesdropping on United States citizens, monitored
international banking transactions, tortured individuals subject to
executive detention, executed signing statements to disavow the
executive’s duty to faithfully execute the laws, and authorized
renditions—the extraordinary practice of kidnapping and shipping a
suspected terrorist to a nation state such as Syria or Egypt—where the
suspect will be tortured.
Rudenstine, supra note 96, at 1431, 1433.
182. Rudenstine, supra note 96, at 1431, 1433 (footnotes omitted).
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And without, I should add, great courage on the part of the
183
journalists and their newspapers.”
As for shield law, Lewis says that the government’s argument
about the national-security need for testimony poses a “serious
obstacle” to Congress passing a shield law. He cites the suggestion of
Geoffrey Stone that to skirt this problem, shield law should provide
for journalists being subpoenaed if their testimony could help in cases
184
involving an “imminent” national security threat.
But Lewis criticizes Stone’s suggestion, saying, “The trouble with
that proposed exception is that it could easily become as wide as a
barn door. The most important press disclosures have had to do with
what the government says is national security: the Pentagon Papers
case, warrantless wiretapping, secret CIA prisons.” While the
government often says the nation’s fate is at stake, according to
Lewis, judges are wary of second-guessing these national security
185
claims.
Lewis has company in fearing that national security poses an
obstacle to federal shield-law enactment. According to Jane Kirtley,
the Justice Department has “vigorously opposed” proposed federal
shield laws, and national security is a reason. She cites as an example
the testimony by a Justice Department representative at a June 2007
hearing that shield laws would protect leaks and thus be a threat to
national security, and that persons covered by the shield law would
include “a terrorist operative who videotaped a message from a
terrorist leader threatening attacks on Americans, because he would
be engaged in recording news or information that concerns
186
international events for dissemination to the public.”

183. Like Papandrea and Werhan, Lewis comments on the Bush administration calling
the reporters traitors and focusing on the leaks, not the “flagrant” law violations. He also
commented that compared to recent abuses of power, “the Pentagon Papers conflict of
1971 seems like simpler days.” Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion, Are Journalists
Privileged? 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2008).
184. Id. at 1357, n.9 and accompanying text (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Half a Shield Is
Better Than None, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/
opinion/21stone.html.
185. Id. at 1357.
186. Jane E. Kirtley, Reporter’s Privilege in the 21st Century: Despite the Ongoing
Controversy Concerning Adoption of a Federal Reporter’s Privilege Statute, the Idea is
Neither New, Nor Novel, 25 DEL. LAWYER 12, 15 (2007/2008) (quoting Hearing Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning H.R. 2102, the Free Flow of Information Act of
2007, 109th Congress 18 (2007) (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Policy), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/hr2102_brand_hjc_
061407.pdf.
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Kirtley sees protection of sources as necessary for supplying
information for public debate: “Stories ranging from Watergate, the
Enron scandal, abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, and conditions at Walter
Reed Army Medical Center depended, at least in part, on
confidential sources.” Without protection for such sources, she says,
187
information and debate will suffer.
Lewis also has company in thinking that a national-security
exception to shield protection could become overbroad.
For
example, Kristen Anastos says of proposed federal shield legislation:
“The national security exception, without which this or any futureproposed Act has little chance of passing, gives the government too
188
wide a loophole with which to bypass the constraints of the Act.”
And Heidi Kitrosser speaks of “a reflexive willingness to slash
189
informed public debate at its root in the name of national security.”
Even the Supreme Court has shown unease with the government
having too close control over information. In Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., the Court said: “A free press cannot be made to rely
solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with
190
information.”
Now say that a member of the press has gotten hold of and
published some classified information. And further, say that the
Justice Department is unwilling or unable to indict a media outlet for
disseminating classified information. A federal prosecutor can make
an end run that can accomplish much the same goal by convening a
grand jury to uncover the source of the leak. The judge can then
order a subpoenaed journalist to disclose the source of the leak or go
to jail, while the confidential source waits, wondering if the journalist
faced with such a Hobson’s choice will choose revelation over
incarceration. Such prospects could perhaps chill even the most
heated leaker who is incensed over government wrongdoing—
wrongdoing that is shielded from public inspection by a system of
classification and the incantation of “national security.” With
187. Id. at 16.
188. Kristen Anastos, Note, Protecting the Public Interest? Why Qualified Legislative
Protection Undermines the Need for a Federal Reporters’ Privilege, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 463, 464 (2006).
189. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 881, 884. On the other hand, W. Cory Reiss wants to
treat national security information differently than any other material. He says that this
would “mitigate” some agencies’ concerns over a shield law. Reiss, supra note 59, at 641,
664–65. He proposes a three-part test for gaining a privilege when national security is
involved: “a track record, a process of deliberation and verification, and transparency.”
Id. at 668–69.
190. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
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increasing prosecutorial pressure on journalists, sources could fade
away, taking their information with them and leaving government
misadventure undisclosed and undeterred.

X. Secrecy and Precedents in the Age of WikiLeaks
For all leakers of information that the government wants to keep
secret, secrecy is a two-edged sword. Generally, leakers do not want
the government to have secrecy, but they want secrecy themselves to
avoid prosecution.
For receivers of leaked information who are within the U.S.
government’s reach, the threat of a grand jury subpoena and a court
order to reveal the source of the leaked information is a serious
threat. The Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes was not
sympathetic to confidential sources because the Court found a
compelling governmental need when the concern was fighting
191
crime.
The need could override any First Amendment values raised by
those who did not want to reveal their confidential sources in front of
192
Thus, if the U.S. government could subpoena Julian
grand juries.
Assange, then it could order him to reveal his source(s) of
information for WikiLeaks.
But perhaps Assange or any other receiver of leaked information
does have a way around Branzburg: ignorance. Assange maintains
that he does not know who his sources of information are because he
has purposefully designed his information-gathering system not to be
able to trace sources. Assange says: “We do not know whether Mr.
Manning is our source or not. . . . [O]ur technology does not permit us
to understand whether someone is one of our sources or not because
193
the best way to keep a secret is to never have it.”
191. The Court opined:
The requirements of those cases . . . which hold that a State’s interest
must be “compelling” or “paramount” to justify even an indirect burden
on First Amendment rights, are also met here. As we have indicated, the
investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental
governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of
the citizen.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (citations omitted).
192. For coverage of Branzburg, see notes 98–114 and accompanying text.
193. WikiSecrets, supra note 1; see also, CNN Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1
(quoting Nick Davies of The Guardian). Of course, there is controversy over whether
Assange really is ignorant of the source of some of his WikiLeaks information. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text. “WikiSecrets” also covered the controversy over whether
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Impossibility (or ignorance) would seem a plausible defense to a
possible contempt citation for refusal to reveal one’s source when
ordered to do so by a judge during grand jury proceedings. In short,
technology has arguably softened the bite of Branzburg in the age of
WikiLeaks.
While the Supreme Court found that the need to fight crime
trumped alleged First Amendment needs in Branzburg, it found that
the First Amendment trumped any other considerations in Bartnicki
194
v. Vopper, which itself echoed Pearson v. Dodd. The question that
reporters must ask themselves, either when receiving illegally
recorded phone conversations as in Bartnicki, or when receiving
information gained through trespass as in Pearson, is whether the
information is of legitimate public concern. In other words, the
reporters must ask themselves whether the information is
newsworthy. If it is newsworthy, and not merely a matter of private
concern, then the reporters may use it.
Bartnicki and Pearson would seem to protect Julian Assange and
newspapers such as The New York Times if they merely received
information without soliciting it, and then disseminated the
195
information. Likewise, New York Times v. United States would
stand as a potent precedent for protecting The New York Times from
punishment for publishing classified information that it received from
Assange.
Protection from the Pentagon Papers case, however, would seem
penetrable. As Justice Byron White said in his concurring opinion:
When the Espionage Act was under consideration in 1917,
Congress eliminated from the bill a provision that would have
given the President broad powers in time of war to proscribe,
under threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various

Manning confessed to leaking to WikiLeaks. When specifically asked about the
“Collateral Murder” video, Assange said, “There was discussion [internally] about, you
know, we have a situation where there’s a young man held in military prison under
investigation who’s alleged to be a source for the ‘Collateral Murder’ video. But we have
published and received military documents long before Bradley Manning ever joined the
Army.” As for the later release of diplomatic cables, there was internal dissension.
Daniel Domscheit-Berg, who left WikiLeaks in 2010, said, “It was clear for me that these
diplomatic cables should not be released . . . Because it was unclear how much that would
implicate someone that had gotten into trouble.” He said, “My gut and my heart say that
you should protect the person.” Id.
194. See supra notes 67–76 and accompanying text .
195. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See also supra notes
106–120 and accompanying text.
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categories of information related to the national defense.
Congress at that time was unwilling to clothe the President
with such far-reaching powers to monitor the press, and those
opposed to this part of the legislation assumed that a
necessary concomitant of such power was the power to “filter
out the news to the people through some man.” 55 Cong.
Rec. 2008 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst). However, these same
members of Congress appeared to have little doubt that
newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they
insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had
itself determined should not be revealed. Senator Ashurst, for
example, was quite sure that the editor of such a newspaper
“should be punished if he did publish information as to the
movements of the fleet, the troops, the aircraft, the location of
powder factories, the location of defense works, and all that
196
sort of thing.”
If a clear case of revealing troop movements were to be found in
197
the WikiLeaks documents, then Near v. Minnesota could also offer
a theoretical possibility of an injunction against publishers of such
information.
The injunction would have to apply to future
publications; once information is out on the Web, getting it back
would be more difficult than putting the proverbial toothpaste back in
the tube. The die would already be cast. Of course, enforcement of
even a prospective injunction could prove difficult at best, given the
198
worldwide digital tentacles of WikiLeaks.

196. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 733–34 (White, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
197. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also supra notes 52–53 and
accompanying text.
198. Based on The New York Times’ scrubbing of WikiLeaks documents for names,
the possibility of the Times reporting troop movements seems remote. According to the
Times, the types of information that have been removed from the documents include:
Names or precise identifying information of sources. Names of buildings
under surveillance. Names of prisoners. Names of kidnap victims. Times
required for various tactical military reactions. Radio frequencies or
phone numbers used in insurgent communications. Names of public
figures (generals, prominent police officials, governors, warlords and
senior afghan officials) have not been redacted, though on a case-by-case
basis, the names of lower-level employees have been removed. Similarly,
well-known insurgent commanders or terrorists are not redacted, but the
names of lower-level figures are.
C.J. Shivers et al., Text From a Selection of the Secret Dispatches, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/26warlogs.html.
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And even if the government arguably could pursue The New York
Times, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder is already on the record as
199
saying the government will not seek sanctions against the Times.
But no publication over which the United States could assert
jurisdiction would be immune from restraint if troop-movement
information became the problem and if the government wanted to
200
take action. The H-Bomb case, United States v. Progressive, would
stand as a precedent for any type of troop-movement leaks for which
the government sought an injunction.
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the
effectiveness of injunctions, if they are to be granted. In Nebraska
201
Press Association v. Stuart, a case concerning the issuance of gag
orders in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the Court
emphasized that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement of First Amendment
202
rights.” Prior restraints could be imposed in cases that passed Judge
Learned Hand’s version of the clear and present danger test, namely,
whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
203
danger.” But such invasion of free speech could not be justified if

In a “note to readers” published with the Afghanistan documents, the Times said:
Most of the incident reports are marked “secret,” a relatively low level of
classification. The Times has taken care not to publish information that
would harm national security interests. The Times and the other news
organizations agreed at the outset that we would not disclose—either in
our articles or any of our online supplementary material—anything that
was likely to put lives at risk or jeopardize military or antiterrorist
operations. We have, for example, withheld any names of operatives in
the field and informants cited in the reports. We have avoided anything
that might compromise American or allied intelligence-gathering
methods such as communications intercepts. We have not linked to the
archives of raw material. At the request of the White House, The Times
also urged WikiLeaks to withhold any harmful material from its Web
site.
Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/26editors-note.html. See also Julie Moos, News
Organizations Publish WikiLeaks Documents With Caution, Innovation, POYNTER (Oct.
24, 2010, 5:44 AM), http://www.poynter.org/uncategorized/106490/.
199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
200. United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). See also supra
notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
201. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
202. Id. at 559.
203. Id. at 562.
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other alternatives existed and if a restraining order would not
204
“effectively . . . operate to prevent the threatened danger.”
As for an injunction against WikiLeaks itself, as noted before,
that would seem a futile endeavor because the “effectiveness” of an
injunction would be problematic given its worldwide reach.
WikiLeaks’ design would almost certainly negate most if not all
external attempts at containing its content. Attempts at enforcement
would thus seem to start a digital game of whack-a-mole, with an
injunction against one WikiLeaks site simply leading to the posting by
another WikiLeaks site, and on and on.
In The New Yorker, Raffi Khatchadourian explained the difficulty
of trying to remove WikiLeaks material from the Internet:
Assange also wanted to insure that, once the video was posted
online, it would be impossible to remove. He told me that
WikiLeaks maintains its content on more than twenty servers
around the world and on hundreds of domain names.
(Expenses are paid by donations, and a few independent wellwishers also run “mirror sites” in support.) Assange calls the
site “an uncensorable system for untraceable mass document
leaking and public analysis,” and a government or company
that wanted to remove content from WikiLeaks would have to
205
practically dismantle the Internet itself.

204. Id.
205. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40 (emphasis
added). Khatchadourian uses WikiLeaks’ stance against Scientology to demonstrate
WikiLeaks’ tough stance against opponents, saying he “typically tells would-be litigants to
go to hell.” After WikiLeaks leaked the church’s secret manuals and lawyers for
Scientology demanded their removal, Assange posted more Scientology material and
proclaimed: “WikiLeaks will not comply with legally abusive requests from Scientology
any more than WikiLeaks has complied with similar demands from Swiss banks, Russian
offshore stem-cell centers, former African kleptocrats, or the Pentagon.” Id. Not only
does Assange take revenge when he considers himself to have been crossed, but so do his
followers. After Frontline aired “WikiSecrets,” hackers attacked PBS’s servers and
posted thousands of stolen passwords. They also posted a fake story about Tupac Shakur
titled “Tupac still alive in New Zealand” on a PBS Newshour blog. A hacker group called
Lulzsec claimed responsibility. Google News indexed the story, and even though PBS
took the story down, it spread through Facebook and Twitter. See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen,
Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks Documentary, THREAT LEVEL (May
30, 2011, 3:29 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/lulzsec/. Assange followers
also staged distributed denial of service attacks. Hacktivists who call themselves
“Anonymous” mounted, for example, an “Operation Payback” against MasterCard after
MasterCard had announced in December 2010 that it would not process attempted
donations to WikiLeaks because MasterCard considered WikiLeaks’ behavior to be
illegal. Anonymous temporarily shut down MasterCard. PayPal, which had announced
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While enjoining WikiLeaks would be difficult if not impossible,
enjoining Manning is a different story. He could theoretically find
himself in legal difficulty for his revelations, again assuming he is
guilty, even if the government did not pursue criminal charges. An
206
injunction against him could be a possibility. Snepp involved no
classified information, but the former CIA agent’s revelations about
his service during the Vietnam War arguably did compromise the
appearance of confidentiality. During the hearing, the then-head of
the CIA testified that sources of information were drying up.
Likewise, the government could argue that the leaking of
information such as State Department cables could compromise the
appearance of confidentiality, inhibiting the sort of free flow of
information that is essential for diplomats to carry out their
diplomatic service. And if the information were also secret, then that
would constitute another compelling reason for acting against the
leaker of the information. The civil remedies could include an
207
injunction against any further leaks and damages.
Snepp’s
publisher, however, did not receive sanctions. Assange and The New
York Times, of course, would stand in the same shoes as Snepp’s
publisher.
Criminal prosecution, however, seems the most likely outcome of
the WikiLeaks situation. Bradly Manning is clearly within the
government’s bullseye. He has already been imprisoned while
awaiting trial. Assuming that Manning gave WikiLeaks massive
doses of confidential information, then he is guilty of violating valid
criminal laws encoded in the Espionage Act. This U.S. Army

that it would freeze WikiLeaks’ account, also suffered a denial-of-service attack. And
Anonymous also temporarily shut down the Swedish prosecution’s website. See Esther
Addley & Josh Halliday, Operation Payback cripples MasterCard site in revenge for
WikiLeaks ban, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2010 http://www.guardian.coluk/media/2010/dec/
08/operation-payback-mastercard-website-wikileaks. Anonymous also targeted Visa, see
Student Charged Over Anonymous’ Attacks in Support of WikiLeaks, TELEGRAPH, Aug.
26, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8723333/Studentcharged-over-Anonymous-attacks-in-support-of-wikileaks.html (British student Peter
Gibson was charged with conspiring to amount a distributed denial of service attack). For
more on how “Anonymous” performs its attacks, visit Zoe Chace, Why the ‘Anonymous’
Hackers Do What They Do, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 26, 2011,
available at www.npr.org/2011/08/26/139977284/why-the-hacker-group-anonymous-doeswhat-it-does.
206. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see also, supra notes 22–32 and
accompanying text.
207. The government was also able to get all the profits from Snepp’s book, Decent
Interval. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
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intelligence analyst, like Morison, will be convicted if the evidence
208
shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Past precedents point to prosecuting persons who work for the
government and then leak information gained while on the job.
Morison is perhaps the precedent most on point for the Manning
case. The cases of Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman, who were
209
Manning, who worked for
indicted together, are also illustrative.
the government, is more similarly situated to Franklin, of course, than
to Rosen or Weissman. Like Franklin, Manning would logically be
the man the government has in its crosshairs. Rosen and Weissman
would be more similarly situated to Assange. With a conviction or
guilty plea from Manning, the government drive, if there be any, to
prosecute Assange might be deflated. In Assange’s case, the
jurisdictional hurdles alone might make any pursuit of him seem not
worth the effort.
Another prosecution that could serve as a precedent in Manning’s
case is that of Drake, a former National Security Agency senior
executive and thus a government employee. Drake, however,
escaped imprisonment, and his case might help quell prosecutors’
210
ardor. And yet another indictment, this time of former CIA agent
Sterling late in 2010, demonstrates that government workers who leak
211
information face a real possibility of criminal prosecution.
Manning, again, would seem to be in the same position as Drake and
Sterling: Government employees who leaked information. Reporters
Risen and Lichtblau would stand in the same position as Assange if
Assange had clean hands in receiving secret information.
The most famous person who worked for the government and
then leaked information to the press is undoubtedly Ellsberg. He
escaped prosecution for violating the Espionage Act when he leaked
the Pentagon Papers material to The New York Times because the
judge at his trial concluded the government had engaged in
misconduct. If the government does not engage in similar misconduct
in Manning’s case, such as breaking into his psychiatrist’s office, then
Manning seemingly would not have the same luck as Ellsberg.

208. Morison v. United States, 486 U.S. 1306 (1988); see also, supra notes 58–66 and
accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 134–142 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
Drake.
211. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
Sterling.
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As for Assange, if he entered into a relationship with Manning to
212
Cogain access to secret material, then he was a co-conspirator.
conspirators, of course, can be prosecuted. Absent a provable
conspiracy, conviction on other matters, such as for sex crimes in
213
Sweden, would seem the available alternative for taking Assange
214
off the worldwide electronic streets.

XI. Conclusion
Leakers take great risks. If allegations against Bradley Manning
are correct, then Manning could face conviction for charges such as
theft and violation of the Espionage Act. Morison was convicted
under the Espionage Act. Franklin pleaded guilty to violating the
Espionage Act for leaking information to the American Israeli Public

212. Raffi Khatchadourian, who wrote the New Yorker profile of Assange cited supra
note 205, wrote this in a June 2011 blog post:
This January, there were reports that U.S. investigators “could detect no
contact between Manning and Assange.” That was surprising. Manning’s
confessions to Lamo make explicit references to direct communications
between him and WikiLeaks. At one point, while trying to answer a
question, Manning writes, “I’ll have to ask Assange.” In another burst of
short notes, he says: (2:04:29 PM) im a source, not quite a volunteer
(2:05:38 PM) i mean, im a high profile source … and i’ve developed a
relationship with assange … but i dont know much more than what he
tells me, which is very little (2:05:58 PM) it took me four months to
confirm that the person i was communicating was in fact assange Some
people doubt the veracity of these logs. I find this aspect of them to be
consistent with what I know and what is reasonable … In May of last
year, my piece about WikiLeaks was making its way through the last
stages of production at The New Yorker. … I did not interview Manning
for the article; nonetheless, while we were working on the piece, he wrote
to Lamo on May 25th and said, “new yorker is running 10k word article
on wl.org on 30 may, btw.” … But how could he have known specifics
about our piece before we had published it? The answer is pretty clear:
someone involved in WikiLeaks, or an intermediary, told him.
Raffi Khathadourian, Manning, Assange, and WikiLeaks, NEWS DESK, May 20, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/manning-assange-andthe-espionage-act.html.
213. See Knickerbocker, supra note 18.
214. Passage of a proposed amendment to section 798 of the Espionage Act, called the
“SHIELD” Act, would broaden the reach of the current Espionage Act and specifically
prohibit revelations of “human intelligence activities” (sec. 2 (4)) and “the identity of a
classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United
States” (sec. 2 (5)). See S.315, introduced March 4, 2011. If passed, the SHIELD Act
would arguably make future leakers such as Assange an easier target for prosecutors than
does the current Espionage Act, which was written in 1917. See supra note 58 (further
discussion of the Espionage Act and the SHIELD Act).
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Affairs Committee. Drake has been indicted for allegedly leaking
NSA information to the media. Sterling was indicted for allegedly
leaking classified information to a journalist about a secret U.S. effort
to slow some countries’ weapon development. Ellsberg might have
been convicted had the government not bungled the case.
Perhaps the government keeps too many secrets. Perhaps those
who think the government is sweeping a lot of merely embarrassing
information under the carpet of secrecy are correct. But perhaps
leakers should not be the ones to determine what information should
see the light of public scrutiny. Julian Assange did come under attack
for some of the sensitive information his WikiLeaks revelations
contained.
Clearly, leaking has become easier in the age of WikiLeaks.
Gutenberg opened the days of the press with limited and slow
distribution. Now, there is no need to copy and carry volumes of
heavy, printed material to convert it into more hard copy for slow
distribution. Immediate access—and the threat of immediate harm
and no means of recall—prevail. There is no bonfire for the Internet
like the one that can be lit under books. There is no Internet
injunction that could circle the globe with an invisible force of law.
The Internet’s ease of disclosure and immediacy of distribution
arguably demands a different mindset than the one that prevailed in
the age of Gutenberg. “Leaner and meaner,” perhaps, should be the
watchword—leaner classification of information and meaner security
of the information that is absolutely necessary to protect. Once the
information is online, it is irretrievably out. Information is out faster
than the proverbial horse with the gate futilely shut behind it.
Speed-of-light communication combined with a Cold War-era
document classification system was a disaster awaiting whomever
leaked the information to Julian Assange. That is, it was a disaster if
viewed from the perspective of a government intent on keeping secret
the trivial information as well as the defensibly classified information
necessary for security, but which government is inept at keeping
secure. In the gap between the government’s desire for keeping
secrets and its execution of a way to secure secrecy, a leaker found
ample room for acquiring information to leak. After all, digital
information occupies no more room than perhaps that available on a
rewritable disk.
The government’s failure to secure information was, to some, a
bonanza instead of a disaster, a thing to be celebrated instead of
bemoaned. Dean Baquet told Frontline:
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If you boil it down, look at what happened as a result of
WikiLeaks. We gained a tremendous understanding of how
government works, how wars are conducted. Balance the
disclosures and the impact and the importance of the
disclosures against everybody’s fear over what was going to
215
happen, seems to me it ended up OK, right?
Perhaps—but not so far, at least, for Bradley Manning. For those
who seek transparency as a goal, WikiLeaks was primarily a positive
development. Daniel Domscheit-Berg said this to Frontline about
WikiLeaks:
It has set in motion a cultural change, in some way that it has
created this whole debate that we are having today. What is
secrecy? And is there a need for secrecy? . . . The goal is not
to get rid of all secrets in this world, but the goal is to foster
216
transparency. And that I think is a really important cause.
And Bill Keller, then the executive editor of The New York
Times, said:
I don’t want to give WikiLeaks credit for the transformation
of the Arab world, but you know, to the extent that Tunisia
influenced Egypt, these cables played some role in the
overthrow of the Mubarak regime. And these things are
having an impact that I don’t think any of us imagined at the
time when it was somebody was just handing us a huge trove
of secret documents.
Indeed, WikiLeaks and Julian Assange have received awards.
For its work in Kenya, WikiLeaks received an Amnesty International
217
award.
And in 2011, the Sydney Peace Foundation awarded
Assange its top award for his “exceptional courage in pursuit of
human rights.” Other winners of the award include Nelson Mandela
218
and the Dalai Lama.

215. WikiSecrets, supra note 1.
216. WikiSecrets, supra note 1.
217. Khatchadourian, supra note 201. WikiLeaks exposed the killings occurring in
Kenya. See CNN Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1.
218. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, WikiLeaks’ Assange awarded top Sydney peace prize,
NEW DELHI TELEVISION, May 11, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/article/technology/wikileaksassange-awarded-top-sydney-peace-prize-104890.
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But the failure to sufficiently redact documents brought Assange
criticism. His “harm minimization” process had missed some
219
informants’ names, exposing them to severe risks.
These exposed
informants could, perhaps, be considered the WikiLeaks form of
“collateral damage.”
The old question of whether the ends justify the means inevitably
arises when some good results flow from some questionable methods.
Arguably the jury is still out on WikiLeaks. Maybe it will be a hung
jury. Thoughtful, well-informed people can disagree, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has so aptly demonstrated on so many 5-4 occasions.
Precedents would seem to point against legal consequences for
Julian Assange. Moral approbation and praise, however, both
continue to flow toward him. For Bradley Manning, on the other
hand, the legal consequences appear rather dire. U.S. law does not
favor government-employed leakers.
While the saga of Bradley Manning unfolds, protests in his favor
continue. For example, on March 20, 2011, Daniel Ellsberg was
arrested near Quantico Marine Corps Base while calling for
Manning’s release from the prison there. About thirty more of the
roughly 400 protesters were also arrested. On that same day, rallies
for Manning occurred in at least eight other cities worldwide,
220
including London, Berlin, and Sydney. On April 23, when President
Obama was in San Francisco at a fundraising breakfast that cost as
much as $35,800 per plate, a table of ten protesters started singing for
221
The protesters, who paid $5,000 per plate and
Manning’s release.
held small “Free Bradley Manning” signs, decried Manning’s prison
222
conditions. And on June 4, more than 200 protesters rallied at Fort

219. Assange reportedly had not wanted to do any redaction whatsoever on the
Afghan War Logs and only did so under pressure, not giving WikiLeaks sufficient time to
do an adequate job. WikiSecrets, supra note 1.
220. Darryl Fears, Protesters Arrested at Rally for Leak Support, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2011, at A4.
221. Kara Rowland, Activists disrupt Obama fundraiser; President laughs off antiwar
hecklers protesting treatment of WikiLeaks figure, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011 at 4. Their
song did indicate that the protesters would still vote for Obama.
222. They sang, among other things: “Even though we don’t know if we’ll retain our
liberties, in what you seem content to call a free society, yes it’s true that Terry Jones is
legally free, to burn a people’s holy book in shameful effigy, but at another location in this
country, alone in a 6 x 12 cell sits Bradley, 23 hours a day is night, the 5th and 8th
Amendments say this kind of thing ain’t right, we paid our dues, where’s our change?”
Carrie Budoff Brown, Obama Gets a Singing Rebuke, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011, 2:10 PM),
www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53546.html.
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Leavensworth, Kansas, calling for Manning’s release from the federal
223
prison located there.

223. Jonathan M. Seidl, Over 200 Protesters Rally Outside Prison of Alleged
WikiLeaker Bradley Manning, BLAZE, June 5, 2011, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/over200-protesters-rally-outside-prison-of-alleged-wikileaker-bradley-manning/;
see
also,
Hundreds protest at Kansas Military Base for Manning Release, DEMOCRACY NOW!, June
6, 2011, available at http://www.democracynow.org/2011/6/6/headlines/hundreds_protest_
at_kansas_military_ base_for_manning_release.
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